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i!!!!! !
Abstract!!!
This thesis is an attempt to consider the central question in the philosophy of memory, ‘what is 
memory’. Specific topics examined are the prominent views on memory in philosophy, causation in 
memory, and the relationship between knowledge and memory. The received theories of memory, 
representative realism and direct realism, comes with their own set of problems. These problems 
are analysed in detail in this work. A view on memory which treats memory as a passive device is 
also examined. It is argued that memory is not a passive device, but it actively reconstructs the 
past. Causal theory of memory and other non-causal explanations are examined. It is argued that 
causal theory has an explanatory advantage over other theories. Trace theory, which has its base 
in neuropsychology, can be helpful in analysing causation and to answer some of the objections 
raised against representative realism and direct realism. The relationship between knowledge and 
memory is also analysed. It is argued that memory does not entail knowledge.!
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Chapter 1!
!
INTRODUCTION!
!
1.1! Introduction!
!
Memory is a fundamental cognitive process which is essential for all other cognitive 
functions including perception and language. As memory subserves many other cognitive 
functions, and is fundamental to human experience, some philosophers have gone so far 
as to claim that memory is a mark of being human. Norman Malcolm, in his analysis of 
memory, writes that “a being without factual memory would not have the ability to 
remember that he was about to do so-and-so or that he had been doing such-and-such. 
[…] A being without  factual memory would have no mental powers to speak of, and he 
would not really be a man even if he had the human form” [212:1963]. To properly 
understand the immense importance of memory in our lives one can look through the 
reported cases where memory does not function correctly.  Squire and Kandel report the 
case of E.P, whose memory started severely debilitating after a viral illness. The report 
goes on to say that E.P., after his memory debilitated, “repeated the same comments and 
asked the same questions over and over again, and he could not keep up with 
conversations. He never came to recognise new visitors to his house, even after more than 
100 visits. […] He was uncertain which house he had earlier lived in for 20 years, or that 
one of his grown children lived next door, or that he had two grand children. The illness had 
kept him from carrying his thoughts and impressions into the future, and it had broken his 
connection to the past, to what had happened in his life before. He was now confined, in a 
manner of speaking, to the present, to the immediate moment” [2: 2009].!
!
In contrast to debilitating memory, there are reported cases where the subject finds it hard 
to forget the information acquired in the past, a condition known as Hyperthymesia. Jill  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Price, a New York woman who was diagnosed with this condition, writes in her memoir, 
“The emotional intensity of my memories, combined with the random nature in which 
they're always flashing through my mind, has, on and off through the course of my life, 
nearly driven me mad. As I grew older and more and more memories accumulated in my 
mind, my memory became not only a horrible distraction in trying to live my life today, but 
also the cause of my terrible struggle to come to terms with my feelings about my past. The 
more memories were stored, the harder and harder it became to cope with the rush of 
recalled events. So many painful memories kept asserting themselves. The thousands of 
things my parents said to discipline me, for example, or blurted out when they were having 
a bad day or when I provoked them have never faded” [38:2009]. While examining a case 
of Hyperthymesia, Parker, Cahill and McGaugh reports that the subject has written to them 
that “Most have called it a gift but I call it a burden. I run my entire life through my head 
every day and it drives me crazy!!!” [35:2006]. Debilitating memory and not being able to 
forget are both equally crippling conditions. !
!
Memory and its nature has been discussed in philosophy from the times of Socrates. In 
Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates debates the nature of memory with Theaetetus and  
Theaetetus calls some of Socrates’s controversial claims about memory as  
“monstrous.” [163d5]. Another important analysis of memory was from Aristotle in his 
classic monograph De Memoria. Early modern philosophers including John Locke, David 
Hume and Thomas Reid discuss memory in detail in their works. They treat memory as a 
topic that holds importance next to perception. Reid writes, “In the gradual process of man, 
from infancy to maturity, there is a certain order in which his faculties are unfolded…, The 
external sense appear first; memory soon follows…, and this seems to be the best order we 
can follow in treating of them” [253:2006]. Contemporary discussions on memory usually 
focus on specific problems in philosophy of memory. Time and memory, memory and 
personal identity, memory and imagination, and memory and its relation with knowledge are 
some of the issues discussed thus. Further, these discussions usually concentrate on any 
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one type of memory. (i.e., propositional memory and knowledge, experiential memory and 
imagination, etc.) The important question, what is memory, is not considered by these 
discussions. My thesis is an attempt to consider this central question, ‘what is memory’. 
The important theories, and views presented by philosophers for some of the basic 
questions regarding the epistemological and phenomenological aspects of memory will be 
analysed in this thesis. In this introductory chapter, I will briefly explain the questions that I 
have considered in my thesis. But before that, some of the basic conceptual distinctions 
and the classifications have to be explained.!
!
!
1.2! Recollecting, Remembering, Imagining!
!
When the subject recollects something, he brings back a certain experience to his mind. 
This re-experience in the mind is different from perception, or any kind of “original 
experience.” For example, I can recollect the pain I usually have when I have a migraine 
attack. But this re-experience in the mind is nothing similar to the original experience - the 
real pain I endure during a migraine attack. Even if my recollection is vivid and strong, it will 
not be anything like the actual migraine attack. Recollection is different from Remembering. 
Recollection is a loose term. Recollection includes remembering, seeming to remember, 
incorrectly remembering and falsely remembering.  When I recollect something from the 1
past, I might be remembering that thing incorrectly. Nevertheless, recollection tells the 
subject things about the past. It is because of this recollection one knows what happened, 
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 Incorrect memory is different from false memory. Incorrect memory is only possible in the context 1
of correct memory. To quote an example from Malcolm, “If I remember a dinner party which 
occurred in such and such a place, at such and such a time, attended by these persons and those 
persons, then there is room for some of my recollections of the occasion to be incorrect - for 
example, that there was a lady seated on my left. But if my belief about the supposed past incident 
was completely false - no social occasion of even approximately that description had occurred - 
one could not say that my memory was incorrect or erroneous” [190:1963]. The first case here, 
where I get some of the details about the past wrong, is a case of incorrect memory. The second 
case, where the past incident did not happen at all, is a case of false memory. Incorrect 
remembering is similar to illusory perception and false remembering is similar to hallucinatory 
perception.
although if the thing recollected is false, the subject will be wrong in thinking that the thing 
recollected actually happened. Also, when I recollect the pain of migraine, I need not have a 
specific episode of migraine attack that I have had, in my mind. Strictly speaking, 
recollecting is not remembering the past, but imagining the past, guided by one’s own past 
experiences. In the thesis, I will be using the term “recollecting” in this loose sense.!
!
!
1.3! Classifications of Memory!
!
One of the classifications of memory, is based on the period of time in which the information 
is retained: This classification, at first presented by William James in 1890, classifies 
memory into short term memory and long term memory. Short term memory is that type of 
memory in which small amounts of information is retained over a brief interval of time and 
long term memory is that type of memory that involves retention over more than a few 
seconds. [Tulving & Craig, 78:2000] Short term memory lasts a few seconds or minutes 
where as Long term memory can last days, weeks or sometimes the lifetime of the 
individual. When the subject learns something it is usually registered in the short term 
memory and then passed on to the long term memory, if needed. From a neurological view 
point, short term memory results from a functional modification in the ability of neurone to 
signal each other where as long term memory involves an actual anatomical change in the 
way the neurone signal. [Squire & Kandel: 2009]!
!
Another classification is based on the conscious thought involved in remembering. 
According to the “content” or thought involved, memory is classified as declarative memory 
and non-declarative memory. Declarative memory, refers to memory of the facts, ideas and 
events where the information remembered can be brought to mind as a verbal proposition 
or image and can be ‘declared’. This can be contrasted to non-declarative memory, which is 
a non-conscious memory ability, where the subject does tasks (like swimming or riding a 
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bike) without consciously thinking about them [Squire, 223:1992]. When we talk about 
memory, usually we mean declarative memory, as this is the type of conscious memory of a 
past event, of a person’s name, or of a birthday. Declarative memory is further classified as 
semantic memory and episodic memory. Semantic memory is declarative memory of facts - 
facts about objects, places, concepts etc. Episodic memory, also called autobiographical 
memory, is the memory of a past experience. It concerns with the personal experiences or 
episodes that occurred in a specific place at a specific time. While semantic memory does 
not store spatial or temporal context of the fact remembered, episodic memory does. !
!
Memories are also distinguished by the cue that triggers the recall of information. Cued 
recall happens when the subject remembers a past episode or a fact with the help of a cue 
- some information presented about the episode/fact. The information given here, the cue, 
is usually some contextual information and is not the same as the information that the 
subject is trying to remember. The cue triggers memory of the event/fact. Free recall is the 
type of remembering where the subject is not presented with any such information to help 
him recall. A third category, recognition, is the type of memory, where the subject 
remembers based on a cue that bears resemblance to the past experience or fact. Here, 
usually the cue presented contains the information that the subject is trying to remember. !
!
In philosophy, memory is traditionally classified as three. Habit memory, experiential 
memory and propositional memory. Habit memory, also called skill memory or procedural 
memory, is remembering how to do something. In habit memory, one need not consciously 
recollect anything from the past. Here, remembering consists in the successful 
performance, ‘getting it right’ or ‘getting it done.’ Examples of habit memory is swimming or 
riding a bike. It is a previously acquired and retained skill and is a matter of being able to 
perform efficiently when the need arises. To ride a bike, one need not remember any past 
occasion on which one rode a bike. A previous occasion on which one one rode the bike 
might assist one’s remembering, but this in no way is necessary. If one’s memory performs 
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well, one need not recall a previous occasion in which one did the thing in question. A J 
Ayer says that, the better one remembers, “the less likely it is that they will have [a previous 
occasion] in mind; it is only when one is in difficulties that one tries as it were to use one’s 
recollections as a manual” [135:1990].!
!
Experiential memory, also called personal memory, is the memory of events that one has 
personally experienced in the past. In experiential remembering, one has to remember 
what happened in the past, and also remember what it was like. Norman Malcolm defines 
personal memory thus. “A person, B., personally remembers something, x, if and only if B 
previously perceived or experienced x and B’s memory of x based wholly or partly on his 
previous perception or experience of x” [215:1963].  Experiential remembering is usually 
accompanied with an ‘image’ of the past event, and involves emotions and feelings (the 
qualitative experiences or ‘qualia’) about the past in varying degrees. Classical 
philosophers usually had experiential remembering in mind, when they analysed memory. 
Thus, Aristotle says that one cannot “remember the future” (which is possible in the case of 
factual memory), John Locke holds that memory is a power of mind to revive perceptions 
with an additional perception attached to it that ‘it has had them before’, and David Hume 
says that memory is the reappearance of those perceptions that the mind have had in the 
past, without losing their vivacity (reappearance of ‘impressions’ as Hume calls them). 
Hermann Ebbinghaus, one of the pioneer psychologists who took the study of memory into 
the laboratory, defines experiential memory as “calling back into consciousness a 
seemingly lost state that is then immediately recognised as something formerly 
experienced” [quoted by Bernecker, 14:2010]. !
!
A third class of memory is propositional memory, also called as semantic memory or factual 
memory. Propositional memory is the memory of facts. Propositional memory is the type of 
memory where we use the word “remember” followed by the clause “that p” where p can be 
substituted by any sentence expressing a proposition. The fact thus remembered can be in 
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any tense. It can be about the past (S remembers that John F. Kennedy was assassinated), 
it can be about the future (S remembers that his birthday is coming up), or it can be 
tenseless too (S remembers that 3+2 = 5). Prima facie, to say that one can remember the 
future looks like an implausible suggestion. But even if the remembered proposition is 
about the future, the claim “I remember that p” includes a reference to the past. It can be 
treated as a short form of saying: "I remember [that I learned - and I have or have not 
completely forgotten the occasion on which I learned it] that p.” One need not have a 
mental imagery of the fact that he is remembering. Also, one need not remember the spatial 
and temporal context in which he learned the remembered fact. When one remembers that 
Kennedy was assassinated or that one’s birthday is coming up, one need not be 
recollecting any past event; nor they need an image. Propositional memory holds an 
important position in the concept of memory. Some philosophers claim that every other type 
of memory in some way or the other, implies propositional memory. Norman Malcolm says 
that he has “not been able to discover any form of memory which does not …[imply] factual 
memory” and says that it is logically impossible for one not to have propositional memory 
and that “a being without factual memory would have no mental powers to speak of, and he 
would not be a man even if he had the human form” [222:1963].!
!
A point to be noted here is that sometimes it is difficult to differentiate between propositional 
memory and experiential memory. Consider, for example, my memory claim: “S remembers 
that he had eaten bacon and eggs for breakfast.” Though the verb ‘remember’ is followed 
by the clause ‘that’, though it is of the schema, “S remembers that p”, if S has a mental 
imagery associated with this memory, one will be inclined to say that it is a case of 
experiential memory. But classifying this as experiential memory, wholly based on the 
imagery associated with it, is problematic. Empirical experiments conducted by 
psychologists suggest that mental-imagery can be completely absent in some people. One 
of the earlier studies in this was conducted by Francis Galton. Some of his respondents 
reported that the visual imagery is “zero” and that “there is almost no association of 
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memory with objective visual impressions.” (As quoted by Schwitzgebel [43:2002])] A more 
recent study by McKelvie (1995) reports that while remembering, some of the subjects have 
imagery perfectly clear and as vivid as vision while some has “no image at all, you only 
‘know’ that you are thinking of the object.” Such difficulties motivate some philosophers to 
say that the distinction between both types of memory is unclear. Bernecker says that 
“there is no way of drawing a sharp and intuitively compelling boundary between 
experiential and propositional memory” [19:2010].!
!
In my thesis, I will be following the philosophical classification of memory, i.e., experiential 
memory, propositional memory and habit memory. Habit memory will not be analysed in 
detail. I will use the terms semantic memory, propositional memory and factual memory 
interchangeably. Terms episodic memory or event memory will sometimes be used instead 
of experiential memory.!
!
1.4! Role of Images in Remembering!
!
As we saw, some scholars claim that imagery is of prime importance in experiential 
memory. Others claim that there need not be imagery at all. But even if there are no “visual 
images” present in a memory experience, there can be other types of images. For example, 
the ‘image’ that accompanies experiential memory need not be a visual image always. 
When I remember a melody I had heard, the ‘image’ might be an auditory one, and when I 
remember the feel of the surface of my table, it could be a tactual ‘image’. The above 
empirical studies conducted by psychologists analysed the presence of visual imageries. 
The point behind the idea of an “image” in philosophy of memory is that one should ‘relive’ 
or ‘re-experience’ the past while experientially remembering it. Wollheim compares the 
imagery involved in such mental states with a theatrical performance, where the subject is 
an “internal dramatist” who draws upon the past event and acts, i.e., represents to himself 
the various characters and experiences [72:1984]. Even those philosophers who hold that 
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an image which represents the past is not required in remembering, do not reject the 
presence of memory-images altogether. Imagery, in this sense, has been the basis for 
traditional accounts of memory. Some philosophers have tried to answer the central 
question what is memory, based on imagery. !
!
There are various difficulties in studying an image and examining the contents of an image. 
Firstly, the contents of an image can be vague, uncertain and elusive. The more one tries to 
determine the accuracy of an event from the memory-image that is presented, the more it 
becomes elusive. Schwitzgebel writes, ”Necessarily, the periphery [of an image] is elusive: 
As soon as you move your attention toward the periphery to determine what it is like, the 
periphery moves somewhere else. Nevertheless, the periphery appears to constitute a 
significant part, if not the bulk, of our conscious experience. […]; so if you are wrong about 
the periphery, you are wrong about a major part of your conscious experience” [39:2002]. It 
should also be noted that the characteristics of the image can only be described by a 
second order act. That is, when the subject produces in himself an image, he can analyse 
the image as an image only by turning his attention away from the contents of it. He can 
describe the object of the image; if the object of the image is an event, he can describe the 
details of the event, the context of the event, and maybe, the time and place of the event. 
But to describe the characteristics of the image as image, he has to turn his attention from 
the object of the image and examine how the image is given. [Sartre, 4:2010].!
!
Something to be noted here is that the presence of image is not an exclusive characteristic 
of memory experience. “It is not possible to think without an image”, says Aristotle. 
Remembering shares its fundamental structure with a diverse array of experiences 
including imagination. In his study on Imagination and the imagistic nature of imagination, 
Sartre says that memory and imagination are dichotomous but also states that “Certainly, 
the memory, from many points of view, seems very close to the image” [181:2010]. Sartre’s 
examples of images in his analysis of imagination were primarily from memory than from 
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imagination.  The images in imagination and memory are so much interrelated that some 2
say Sartre’s phenomenological description of imagination is wholly applicable to 
recollection. [Levy, 143:2012]. This similarity in the phenomenology of memory and 
imagination sometimes makes it difficult for us to differentiate genuine memory from 
imagination, incorrect-memory and false-memory. This difficulty also poses problems for 
certain theories of memory as we will see. Some philosophers attempt to solve this problem 
by trying to find a memory-mark in the memory-images, a mark which says that the image 
is a memory-image, thus differentiating it from other images. Thus, Hume says that a 
memory-image is more vivid than the imagination-image and that they maintain their “order 
and form” in which its objects are presented [11-12:2000], Russell speaks of “feelings of 
familiarity” and “feelings of pastness” that comes along with the image [163:2007], and 
Harrod speaks of “liveliness” of the image [51:1942]. Such attempts have their own 
limitations, and cannot convincingly explain the difficulty one faces in differentiating 
memory-images from other images. The image, or the experience alone cannot tell us 
conclusively about the nature of the image. As Don Locke writes, “So long as it is possible 
for people to be mistaken, or even unsure, about whether they are remembering, as 
opposed to imagining, then it seems it cannot be anything about the experience itself that 
tells us which it is” [9:1971].!
!
Despite these difficulties, “image” is of central importance in the analysis of experiential 
memory for many reasons. Chiefly because there are experiences which are verbally 
indescribable, and can be recalled only with the aid of an image. The taste of a candy, or a 
melody heard in the past, or the experience of a splitting headache, can all be called back 
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 Sartre says that he was sometimes able to draw his “examples from memory to better understand 2
the nature of image.” [181:2010]. But some of his other examples, specifically chosen to illustrate 
the images in imagination are also from memory. To show the “given-absent” nature of imagination 
Sartre chooses an example of the image of a dead friend. He says, “If the image of a dead loved 
one appears to me abruptly, there is no need for a ‘reduction’ to feel the ache in my heart; it is part 
of the image. It is the direct consequence of the fact that the image gives its object as a 
nothingness of being.” The image in this example is more similar to a memory-image than of an 
imagination-image.
to mind only with the help of an (visual, tactual or auditory) image. In their seminal paper 
Remembering, although Martin and Deutscher says that it is a mistake to insist that a 
person must have mental images of what he remembers, they admit that if someone cannot 
form a mental image of the sound of a musical instrument, or the look of affected concern 
on a person's face, then one may well be completely at a loss to recall such things in any 
other way. [165: 1966] In such cases, images are not aide-mémoire - but what constitutes 
the memory itself.!
!
In other types of memory however, image does not go to constitute the memory-
experience. In propositional memory and in habit memory, one need not bring back the past 
occasion to one’s mind for a successful performance. When I remember that India was 
partitioned in the year 1947, I need not remember the occasion in which I learned this fact. I 
might have an image of reading a history book, or learning this fact in the school. But that 
image is not what constitutes my memory. I can remember the fact without having an image 
at all. The remembering here, consists in getting the fact right. The more easily I remember, 
the more correctly my memory functions, the less likely it is that I need assistance of an 
image. AJ Ayer writes, “To have learnt a thing properly is to be able to dispense with 
them” [137:1990].!
!
!
1.5! Remembering, Representation, Metarepresentation!
!
To claim that I remember p, I must not only represent p, but also know that I had 
represented p in the past. That is, there is a second-order representation or a meta-
representation in my claim. If I say that I remember Gandhi was assassinated, my claim 
includes two believes. First, I believe that Gandhi was assassinated, and second, I believe 
that I have learned in the past that Gandhi was assassinated. If this was not learned in the 
past, if I have just read this fact in a book, I cannot claim that I am remembering it. 
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Erroneous memories can happen if the meta-representational claim is false. An example 
suggested by von Leyden [60:1961] goes thus: S sees crowd panicking in Trafalgar 
Square. S interprets this scene as a stage setting of a film and falsely believes that a film 
was being shot at Trafalgar square. S subsequently claims to remember that there was a 
film shooting at Trafalgar square. Here, the memory claim is erroneous because the meta-
representational claim is false. Strictly speaking, memory is not at fault here, as the meta-
representational claim is false because the original perception was faulty. Leyden says that 
“it is the inheritance of a mistake, not a mistake of inheritance” [62:1961]. !3
!
1.6! Truth in Memory:!
!
For the memory claim to be true, 1) the content of the thought has to be true and 2) one should 
have represented the content in the past.!
!
For me to remember that the last lunar eclipse was on October 18, 2013, it must be true that the 
last eclipse was on October 18th. I cannot say that I remember this unless it is so. Similarly, I must 
also have learned this information in the past for me to remember this date. If I have just learned 
this, I cannot claim that “I remember”. These two conditions are not independent. My present 
thought content must be true because my past thought content was true. If my past thought was 
not true, the present reproduction of it cannot be true, and it will not qualify as memory.!
!
!
1.7! Chapters!
!
1.7.1! Representative Realism, Direct Realism, Trace Theory!
!
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 A similar example is given by GEM Anscombe in her paper The Reality of the Past. [107:1981] 3
Both these examples go on to show that a functional fault of memory need not be the only reason 
for errors in memory.
What is it to recollect something? What processes does it involve, and what is the nature of 
it? Can memory provide us with knowledge of the past and if it can, how does it do it? Any 
account of memory has to consider these questions and has to answer them. One of the 
obvious answers is that when I remember something, I recall that something and bring it to 
my mind. This natural answer is the basis for two important theories on memory: 
Representative Realism and Direct Realism. The first chapter of the thesis will be an 
analysis of these theories.!
!
According to David Hume, perceptions of the human mind or the element in our mind to 
which our focus of attention turns when we think, can be classified into two. Impressions 
and Ideas. Impressions are those that enter with strength and intensity under which all our 
perceptions or sensations belong. Ideas are reappearance of these impressions without 
their original vivacity. Ideas are faint images of impressions, which lack strength and 
intensity. If the reappearing impression loses its entire strength and intensity, it is a perfect 
idea. The reappearing impression can also retain a considerable degree of its vivacity, and 
can be between a perfect impression and a perfect idea. According to Hume, if the 
reappearing impression retains its intensity, it is memory and if it reappears without its 
intensity as an idea, it is a case of imagination. This account, where a vivid image which 
represents an event that has already happened re-appears in the mind, is the basis of 
representative theory. !
!
In his analysis of memory, Don Locke [3:1971] summarises Representative theory thus: !
“To remember is to undergo a certain sort of mental experience. In particular, it is to 
experience an image, a memory-image, which reproduces some past sense-experience. 
The image might even be said to be literally a reproduction of the original sense-
impression, which has, in the meantime, been stored away in the mind. This image 
provides us with the information we are then said to remember; it is because we have and 
experience the image that we have the particular piece of memory-knowledge.”!
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!
The representative realist holds that, in recollection, it is an image that one is directly aware 
of. This image is the object of one’s experience. The past constitutes the memory-image 
and one’s relation to the memory-image constitutes one’s memory experience. While 
remembering, we are aware of this image and this image gives us information about the 
past. We are in contact with the past via this image, and it is in this sense the awareness of 
the past is indirect. But if what we are aware of is the image that occurs in the present, that 
would mean that our awareness is not of the past. The awareness is not of what has 
happened in the past, but is of what is happening in the present. !
!
This theory raises a lot of questions. The most important question that a representative 
realist will have to answer is that, how can an image or representation that happens now, in 
the present, give us the awareness of the past, something that does not happen now, that 
is not present now. !
!
In contrast to representative realism, there is the theory of Direct Realism, which avoids the 
difficulties that a representative realist faces. According to direct realism, an intermediary 
image is not required for remembering. While remembering, one is having a direct 
awareness of the past, without any intermediary image. One of the early summarisations of 
a direct realist position comes form Thomas Reid in his work, An Inquiry into The Human 
Mind. Reid writes, “Suppose that once, and only once, I smelled a tuberose [and] next day I 
relate what I saw and smelled. When I attend as carefully as I can do what passes in my 
mind in this case, it appears evident that the very thing I saw yesterday, and the fragrance I 
smelled, are now the immediate objects of my mind, when I remember it. Upon the strictest 
attention, memory appears to me to have things that are past, and not present ideas, for its 
object” [28:1997]. According to J Laird, another direct realist, “memory does not mean the 
existence of present representations of past things, it is the mind’s awareness of past 
things themselves” [56:1920].!
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!
There is nothing that mediates one’s access to the past, which means there are no 
questions about the nature and characteristics of an intermediary image, and the 
relationship between this image and the past. That is, direct realist avoids the difficulties 
that a representative realist face, but this position comes with its own set of problems. For 
example, how can the subject have an immediate knowledge of a past event now, at the 
time of remembering as the past event cannot exist now?!
!
Trace theory is not a theory which is very different from representative realism. It is a 
scientific theory which tries to explain the physical presence of a representation in one’s 
brain. This theory achieves significance as this can explain many difficulties faced by a 
representative realist. In representative view, there are two steps involved in the process of 
remembering. Firstly, the rememberer is conscious of the image. Secondly, the rememberer 
then interprets the past event from this image. This motivates some philosophers to claim 
that the representative view is a form of dualism. [Woozley, 40:1949]!
!
Trace theory postulates engrams or memory traces in brain, which are representations of 
the past events and experiences. For the rememberer, there is no need to go beyond this 
representation to become aware of the past. That is, memory involves a representation of 
the past, but it need not involve an awareness of the representation itself. We are not 
conscious of the traces when we remember an episode from the past. The ‘interpretation’ of 
these traces and the translation of these traces to the information about the past event, 
happens unconsciously. We need not go beyond ‘the given’ and in this sense there is no 
dualism involved in remembering.!
!
In this chapter, I attempt to examine representative theory and direct realist theory, the 
problems faced by these theories and the attempted solutions for these problems. I attempt 
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to show that a proper understanding of trace theory can successfully solve many of these 
problems.!
!
!
1.7.2!! Copy Theory!          
!
In the beginning of this introduction, I said that recollecting does not amount to 
remembering. I also said that recollecting is imagining the past, guided by one’s own past 
experiences. As one’s own past experience is involved in recollection, a representative 
element is present in recollection. But this element will not make recollection a case of 
remembering. What makes a case of recollection, a case of remembering? Genuine 
remembering has to copy the past and reproduce it at a later time. Our every day notion of 
remembering is something similar to that of the function of a photocopier. At t2 S 
remembers that p only if p was true at t1 and p is true at t2. As one cannot remember 
something which is not true, some philosophers hold a view that memory is a passive, 
input-output device, which reproduces a copy of the past thoughts and experiences. I 
examine this view in my second chapter. !
 !
An early version of the copy theory of memory was first proposed by Aristotle in his De Memoria. 
Aristotle compares a memory image with the image sealed by a signet ring in hot wax. From there 
emerged an entire tradition in which memory is reduced to a process of registering and storing 
impressions. This tradition is still very much alive. This model of memory stands against the model 
of “activism” where memory-images and memory as such, is not a duplication of the past thought, 
but an active reconstruction of the information. That is, memory reconstructs the past experience 
or thought and does not merely copy the past thought content [Bartlett (1932), Janet (1928) ]. This 4
reconstructive nature of memory, they claim, is the reason behind difficulty in distinguishing 
memory from imagination or confabulation.!
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 As quoted by Casey [15:1987]4
!
There are many arguments raised against copy theory of memory. If the reproduction of a past 
event is in any way different from the original event, it can be argued that the copy theory is 
incomplete. Also, we sometimes have episodes of summarised memory, where memory comes up 
with a summary of a certain period. Such summarised memories are also cited as an objection to 
copy theory. !
!
I examine these objections raised against copy theory. My conclusion in this chapter is that most of 
the arguments raised against copy theory are not serious threats to the theory. I conclude that the 
theory is incomplete, for summarised memory is sometimes part of the function of memory.!
!
!
1.7.3 ! Memory Causation!
!
Even if it can be shown that copy theory is not faulty and the objections raised against copy 
theory are not a serious threat to the theory, merely copying and reproducing the past will 
not go on to make genuine memory. The reproduction of the past event, or the present 
memory-experience should be appropriately connected to the past event for it to be a case 
of memory.!
!
What does an appropriate connection mean? In contemporary discussions, this means an 
appropriate causal connection. That is, memory should be causally connected to the 
remembered event. If it is a case of propositional memory, it should be causally connected 
to the past time at which the subject learned the information. However, causal connection is 
not the only appropriate connection between past representation and the present 
representation. There are philosophers who hold the view that a causal connection is not 
needed at all. Before 1960s, many philosophers held a view that our concept of memory did 
not require a causal connection between the past experience and the present recollection.  
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This view was advocated by Ryle (1949), Malcolm (1963), Munsat (1966) and Zemach 
(1968).!
!
It was Martin and Deutscher’s seminal paper on memory, Remembering [1966], that 
brought the causal condition to the forefront of the philosophical and psychological 
discussion on memory. In their paper, Martin and Deutsher argued against the claim that a 
causal process is not required for the concept of memory. I analyse Martin and Deutscher’s 
version of causal theory, and my conclusion here is that this version of causal theory is 
problematic, as the argument is from counterfactuals. After questioning M&D, I examine 
other causal accounts and show these have problems too. In the chapter I also consider 
some of the non-causal explanations of memory-retention. I conclude that the non-causal 
theories are weak and can be proven faulty. Though causal theory and the present 
arguments for it are problematic, it clearly has an explanatory advantage over non-causal 
theories.!
!
!
1.7.4 ! Knowledge and Memory!
!
In this chapter, I analyse how memory can provide knowledge of the past. In our everyday 
life, we usually trust our memory-cognitions. We usually consult our memory and take our 
memory-cognitions at face value. We think that if we remember that p, we know that p. This 
motivated some philosophers to hold a view that propositional memory entails knowledge. 
According to them, if I remember that p, I know that p. In his detailed analysis of memory, 
Norman Malcolm says, “A person B, remembers that p if and only if B knows that p 
because he knew that p.” [223:1963]. Similarly, Robert Audi states, “if you remember that 
we met, you know that we did.” [67:2011]. Roger Squires [1969] and Michael Dummett 
[1996] viewed memory as retention of knowledge. The received view in philosophy of 
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memory is that, if one learns that p at t1, and remembers that p at a later time t2, one knows 
that p at t2. !
!
The alternate view, the view that memory does not provide knowledge, is not a new one. In 
Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates says that one must be directly acquainted with the object, to 
know that object. In the case of memory, such a direct acquaintance is impossible, and thus 
it is impossible to know what is remembered. That is, memory, even when it is accurate, 
does not provide us with knowledge. [163d5] !
!
The view that is prevalent in the contemporary discussions on memory, is the epistemic 
theory of memory, the view that memory provides us with knowledge of the past. This is 
also the common sense view. Bernecker summarises the epistemic theory of memory thus. 
“To remember that p is to know that p, where this knowledge was previously acquired and 
preserved. A source other than memory is responsible for the original acquisition of 
knowledge that p. Memory preserves rather than generates knowledge” [67:2010].!
!
Since the three conditions, belief, justification and truth are individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for the traditional concept of propositional knowledge, these three 
conditions have to be satisfied in propositional memory too. Among these conditions, the 
third condition, the truth-condition, is unproblematic. One can know or remember only what 
is the case. If the case is not-p, then S’s cannot remember that p. He might think that he 
remembers or might even claim knowledge, but cannot actually remember. The other two 
conditions, justification condition and belief condition are not so. These conditions need to 
be examined and if it can be shown that one can remember that p though one did not 
justifiably believed that p in the past, or that one can remember that p though one does not 
justifiably believe that p in the present, the epistemic theory fails. I analyse the justification 
condition and the belief condition in the epistemic theory of memory. My conclusion here is 
that it is possible for one to remember that p, without believing that p. One can also 
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remember that p, without having justification for p. In sum, one can remember that p, 
without knowing that p. I conclude that epistemic theory of memory fails.!
!
My final section summarises the conclusions of the earlier chapters. I also try to spell 
out the wider consequences of my conclusions. That is, whether and how it will have an 
impact on habit memory. For example, relation between knowledge and habit memory is 
an interesting problem. Even if we can successfully argue that propositional memory 
does not entail knowledge, this argument will fail in the case of habit memory. For, in 
habit memory, remembering is giving a successful performance. I will also attempt to 
explain how we can see the distinction between imagination, recollection and 
remembering in a better light, based on the analyses.  
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Chapter 2!
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!
THEORIES OF MEMORY!
!
2.1! Introduction!
!
A philosophical theory of memory attempts to answer the question, what happens when we 
remember something? This is different from the question about the neurological process that is 
involved in recollection. Neurologists have their explanations about the internal processes that 
happen in one’s brain when one recalls something. A philosophical theory of memory is different 
from this. It is primarily concerned with the mental occurrences that happen when one remembers 
a past event. These mental occurrences might be connected to or rooted in the neurological 
changes in one’s brain. In philosophy, however, remembering and memory are the terms primarily 
used to denote the mental occurrences that happen when one remembers something. !
!
When we examine remembering, there are a few prima facie observations we can make without 
much difficulty. While remembering, one calls back something from the past to one’s mind. Both in 
experiential memory and propositional memory, this recall has a number of similarities with the 
original events and thoughts. In experiential memory, recalling is similar to the original experience 
from the past. While experientially remembering, in a sense, we are re-experiencing the past event 
and the remembering might accompany the past feelings and emotions. In propositional memory, 
the content of the recalled thought is similar to the content of the original thought. The recall is also  
different from the original experience in a number of ways. The recalled experience is weak, vague 
and less vivid than the original experience. When one recalls a headache one had on the previous 
day, the recollection is completely different from the actual headache that one had. Nevertheless, 
there is something that the subject is aware of, when he recalls something from the past. These 
are the basic observations that we can make about memory. From these obvious and straight-
forward observations, come two major theories of memory; Representative Realism and Direct 
Realism. Both these theories hold that: !
 21
!
1. There is something that the subject is aware when he remembers. !
2. What the subject is aware of is the object of memory. Representative realists argue that when 
one remembers, the object of memory is an image (or an ‘idea’, in Humean terms) of the past. 
The image re-presents the past to the subject and the subject’s awareness of the past is 
through this image. In contrast to this view, direct realists hold that, what the subject is aware of 
when he remembers is the past itself and there is no image or representation that mediates his 
awareness of the past. !
!
I will start with two major arguments for representative realism in perception. These are important 
in memory too. I will  then analyse  representative realism in memory and will examine the 
arguments raised against this theory. The direct realist theory of memory and the problems in this 
theory will be examined next. After this, trace theory of memory will be examined. Strictly speaking, 
trace theory is not a philosophical theory. But this theory has a few interesting observations which 
are philosophical in nature. In this chapter I do not argue for or propose a new theory. The point I 
am trying to make is that both the theories - representative realism and Direct Realism - are flawed 
and cannot satisfactorily reply to the arguments raised against them.!
!
2.2! Argument from Illusion and Argument from Hallucination!
!
Representative realism is by far the most widely held theory of memory. One of the first advocates 
of representative realism was Aristotle. In his De Memoria Aristotle says that “memory, even the 
memory of the objects of thought, is not without an image” and that such images are “a sort of copy 
and a reminder” of another thing [449b30]. This “mental image” one has while remembering, is 
given central importance in the analysis of memory by David Hume to Bertrand Russell. In many 
ways this view is similar to the sense-datum theory of perception. In perception, according to the 
sense-datum theory, when a subject perceives a worldly object which has a certain sensible 
quality, he is aware of something which possesses that sensible quality. This awareness is his 
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object of experience. The object of experience is distinct from the worldly object. Representative 
realists say that the object of experience (that which is given to the senses) is sense-data. Sense-
datum theory is motivated by two important arguments, the argument from illusion and the 
argument from hallucination. It would be helpful to explain these two arguments briefly here, as 
these arguments are important in memory in many ways. Firstly, in memory, there are cases which 
are similar to hallucination and illusion. Secondly, the difficulties that these arguments raise are 
important in memory too.!
!
Illusion is defined as a “perceptual situation in which a physical object is actually perceived, but in 
which that object perceptually appears other than it really is” [Smith 23:2002]. Here, the object is 
incorrectly ‘seen’ by the subject. For example, if a red coloured ball is seen as an orange coloured 
one, it is a case of illusion. Hallucination is when “it seems to the subject as though something is 
seen but where in fact nothing is seen” [Fish 3:2010]. An example would be Macbeth’s 
hallucination of a dagger.!
!
The arguments from illusion and hallucination attempt to endorse the Common Factor principle, 
which says that phenomenologically indistinguishable perceptions, hallucinations, and illusions 
have an underlying mental state in common. To take an example from HH Price [3:1932], suppose 
the subject sees a tomato. There are a lot of things that he can doubt. What he sees might be a 
reflection of a tomato or might be a piece of wax resembling a tomato. Consider all these three 
possibilities: The subject is seeing a real tomato kept in front of him; the subject is seeing a piece 
of wax resembling a tomato; the subject is hallucinating that he is seeing a tomato. According to 
the common factor principle, no matter in which category the visual experience falls into, the 
underlying mental state is the same.!
!
When the subject perceives, he is aware of something. This principle is the first premise of both the 
arguments. Robinson calls this the phenomenal principle and defines it thus: “If there sensibly 
appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is 
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something of which the subject is aware which does possess that quality” [32:2001]. While having 
a visual experience of a tomato, there is something that which the subject is aware of. He can 
doubt many things about what he sees. What the subject cannot doubt however, is that “there 
exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other 
colour patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly 
present to [his] consciousness.” [Price, 3:1932]!
!
The subject is aware of something in illusion and hallucination too; there sensibly appears to him to 
be something which possesses a particular sensible quality. If it is a case of hallucination, there is 
no worldly object for the subject to perceive. If it is a case of illusion, the subject is seeing the 
object incorrectly or ‘as it is not’. That is, in both these cases, it is not a worldly object that the 
subject is aware of as it is. But there is something that the subject is aware of as it is. Thus this 
awareness seems to be of a non-physical mental-object. This non-physical object is commonly 
referred to as sense-data. This, along with the common factor principle, gives us the conclusion 
that in veridical perception the subject is aware of sense data.!
!
The argument is summarised by Robinson[56 -57:2001] as follows:!
!
1. In some case of perception, physical objects appear other than they actually are - that is, they 
appear to possess sensible qualities that they do not possess.!
2. Whenever something appears to a subject to possess a sensible quality, there is something of 
which the subject is aware which does possess that quality.!
!
Therefore !
!
3. In some cases of perception there is something of which the subject is aware which possesses 
sensible qualities which the physical object the subject is purportedly perceiving does not 
possess.!
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4. If a possesses a sensible quality that b lacks, then a is not identical to b.!
!
Therefore!
!
5. In some cases of perception that of which the subject is aware is something other than the 
physical object the subject is purportedly perceiving. !
6. There is such continuity between those cases in which objects appear other than they actually 
are and cases of veridical perception that the same analysis of perception apply to both.!
!
Therefore!
!
7. In all cases of perception that of which the subject is aware is other than the physical object the 
subject is purportedly perceiving. [What the subject is aware of, is then called sense-data.]!
!
Coming back to memory, consider the cases of false memory and incorrect memory. Incorrect 
memory is similar to illusion. Illusion is where the subject sees the object incorrectly or ‘as it is not.’ 
If a red wax model is incorrectly perceived as an apple, it is a case of illusion. In memory, if I recall 
some of the details from the past incorrectly, and still claims remembering, I am remembering ‘as it 
is not.’ It is a case of incorrect memory. Incorrect memory is different from false memory. False 
memory is similar to the cases of hallucination. In hallucination, subject is seeing nothing though it 
seems to him that he is seeing something. There is nothing in the outside, mind-independent, 
world that resembles his visual experience. In false memory, there is nothing in the past that 
resembles the subject’s recollection. Norman Malcolm explains the difference between both these 
types of memory thus: “If a man told us that once he lunched with Winston Churchill, and then it 
turned out that it was breakfast, not lunch, his memory was incorrect. […] If he had never met 
Churchill at all, and had indeed never encountered any of the great ones in the world, and always 
took meals with his wife only, then there seems to be no respect in which his alleged memory of 
having lunched with the Prime Minister is incorrect. And also there is no respect in which it is 
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correct” [190:1963]. In the former case the subject is incorrectly remembering and in the latter 
case, he is falsely remembering. The common factor principle of perception is applicable in the 
case of memory too. That is, the cases of incorrect memory, false memory and genuine memory 
have an underlying mental state in common. !
!
The theory of sense-datum is motivated by the phenomenological considerations. It concludes that 
while having a visual experience, the subject’s immediate awareness is of a non-physical private 
thing called sense data. In memory however, it is indisputable that, in memory, the subject’s focus 
is turned inwards. In memory, the subject’s focus is not towards his environment, nor is there a 
question of mind-independent entities. Memory-experience is a mental event and while 
remembering, the subject’s attention is directed towards his own mental event. The representative 
theory of memory aims to explain this mental event. !
!
The object of memory, the mental event that we attend to when we remember, refers to the past . 5
Yet this mental event is happening now, in the present. A layman’s view would be that, while we 
remember, the actual event that had happened in the past is the object of memory. That is, if I am 
remembering a wedding party that I had attended last year, what is immediately before my mind is 
that very same event. This ordinary view raises some difficult questions. Firstly, how can an event 
that occurred in the past and concluded in the past, be present to my mind now, at the time of 
remembering? How can the past which does not exist at the time of remembering, be the object of 
remembering? Secondly, if my immediate awareness is of the actual event in the past, then how do 
I explain incorrect remembering? Sometimes incorrect memory and false memory are 
indistinguishable from genuine memory. While remembering the wedding party, I might 
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 In propositional memory, it seems possible that one can remember propositions about the future, 5
(S remembers that his birthday is coming up next week) or tenseless propositions (S remembers 
that the value of pi is 3.14). But even such propositions contains a reference to the past. It refers to 
the time in which S has learned the proposition. Woudenberg [119:1999] writes that when S says “I 
remember that next year will be election year”, it is a shorthand for "I remember that I learned [and 
I have or have not completely forgotten the occasion on which I learned it] that next year will be 
election year”.!
misremember the suit I wore to the party or the people I met in the party. This cannot happen if the 
actual event is present to my mind. These problems with the ordinary view motivate a 
representative realist to hold that, while remembering, the subject’s immediate awareness is not 
that of the actual event in the past, but an image which represents the past event. The object of 
memory is an image of the past.!
!
However, we know that sometimes it is difficult to distinguish memory from imagination. We find it 
hard to distinguish genuine memory from incorrect memory or false memory. The mental-event that 
happens in these three cases, genuine memory, false memory and incorrect memory, seems to be 
the same. In all these cases, we are aware of something, and we take it to be something from the 
past. That is, mental-image is not a feature exclusive to memory-experience. We have images of a 
lot of things that we do not remember too. Thus, to make the theory feasible, a representative 
realist will have to find a way to distinguish genuine memory-images from other images. I will come 
back to this shortly, but before that I will explain the notion of representation involved in the 
representative realism.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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!
!
!
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Consider the above two images. Both fig 1. and fig 2. ‘tells us’ something about Gandhi. Fig. 1 
does it by using a photograph, and fig 2 does it by using words and language. Both these images 
represent Gandhi. These two images tell us different things about Gandhi. The first image, the 
photograph, tells us that he wore spectacles, that his head was shaven and that he had a 
moustache. The second figure, tells us that he was a political leader who took part in the Indian 
freedom movement. The first figure does not tell us anything about his political views and the 
second figure does not tell us anything about his appearance. We can say that, the content of the 
first figure is Gandhi’s appearance, and the content of the second figure is about his political 
leadership. Representation’s content is the information that the representation provides us with. It 
is what the representation ‘tells us’. Sometimes the representation can also misinform us. For 
example, if the second figure had said that Gandhi was the prime-minister of India, it would still 
inform us of something - but the information is wrong. In that case, it would be a misrepresentation.!
!
One can also say that the first figure is a bunch of colours and shades presented in a certain way. 
If we show the first image to someone who has not seen the images of Gandhi, he might take it to 
be the image of a smiling old man. Similarly, we can show the second figure to someone who is not 
familiar with any forms of written language and can tell him that this is how words are written. For 
him then, it will represent written language. When we say that the image represents Gandhi, it 
does not mean that it is a feature of the image itself. It is something that we interpret. When we see 
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the first figure as that of Gandhi, we take the image to be in a certain way. The point is that, strictly 
speaking the image is not representational. It does not represent anything. When we take that to 
be representing something, it is a way in which we interpret the image rather than that something 
being a feature of the image itself.!
!
!
2.3! Representative Realism!
!
I will now turn to the accounts of representative realism in memory. According to David Hume, 
perceptions of the human mind, or the mental entity to which our focus of attention turns when we 
think, can be classified into two. Impressions and Ideas. Impressions are those that enter with 
strength and intensity, under which all our perceptions or sensations belong. The reappearance of 
impressions are called ideas. Ideas are faint images of impressions, which lack strength and 
intensity. If the reappearing impression loses its entire strength and intensity, it is a perfect idea. 
The reappearing impression can also retain a considerable degree of its vivacity, and can be 
between a perfect impression and a perfect idea. If the impression reappears without any of its 
strength and intensity, it is imagination and if the reappearance retains some of the strength and 
intensity, it is memory. This account, where an idea or an image that re-appears in the mind 
represents an event that has already happened, acts as the basis of representative theory in all the 
later philosophical analyses. In his analysis of memory, Don Locke summarises Representative 
Theory thus: !
!
“To remember is to undergo a certain sort of mental experience. In particular, it is to experience an 
image, a memory-image, which reproduces some past sense-experience. The image might even 
be said to be literally a reproduction of the original sense-impression, which has, in the meantime, 
been stored away in the mind. This image provides us with the information we are then said to 
remember; it is because we have and experience the image that we have the particular piece of 
memory-knowledge” [3:1971].!
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There are a number of questions that need to be examined here. Firstly, what is the nature of this 
image? Secondly, in what sense is awareness of the past indirect? Thirdly, how can we be aware 
of this image or representation? Fourthly, how can an image or representation that happens now, 
in the present, give us the awareness of the past, something that does not happen now, that is not 
present now?!
!
!
2.4! Memory-Images in Representative Realism!
!
It is important to note that the ‘image’ that we talk about need not be something similar to a 
photograph. It need not necessarily be a visual one. Suppose I remember a song.. My focus here 
is not on the visual details, but on the song. I can remember hearing the song without any of the 
visual details. That is, the image that I would have here would be an auditory image. Similarly, if I 
remember running my hand over the surface of the table a while ago, my focus is not on the visual 
details, but how I felt while running my hand over the table. The image here would be a tactual 
image. When Hume, and other representative realists,  talk about an image, they mean an image 
in this general sense.!
!
We saw that the representative realist holds that in memory-experience, it is an image that one is 
immediately aware of. This image is the object of one’s experience. The past determines the 
memory-image and one’s relation to memory-image constitutes one’s memory experience. While 
remembering, we are aware of this image and this image gives us information about the past. We 
are in contact with the past via this image, and it is in this sense the awareness of the past is 
indirect. But if what we are aware of is the image that occurs in the present, that would mean that 
our awareness is not of the past. The awareness is not of what has happened in the past, but is of 
what is happening in the present.!
!
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One way to reply to this objection is by treating the image as a reproduction of the original 
impression. If the memory-image is something that is stored away in a mental repository and if it is 
something that can be called back when needed, then the reappearance and subsequent 
awareness of that image, even if it occurs in the present, can bring awareness of the past. This 
metaphor of a store-house or repository is widely popular among the philosophers who analysed 
memory. Endel Tulving quotes Fenaingale’s model of memory and says, “The memory may be 
compared to a warehouse stored with merchandise” [5:1983]. Tulving further comments that the 
“Spatial Analogies of memory are still popular in our day and the successful operation of memory is 
greatly dependent upon the organisation of the material in store” [Tulving and Donaldson, 1972]. 
Gruneberg and Peter Morris [1978] compares memory system with a tape recorder. Other 
comparisons include archives, libraries, wine cellars, warehouses, palaces, treasure chests and 
vaults, mystic writing pad, conveyor belt, dictionary, garbage-can etc. ([Draaisma 3:2000], 
Roedigar [233:1980]). St. Augustine says “when I am in this storehouse [of memory], I ask that it 
produce what I want to recall, and immediately certain things come out; some things require a 
longer search, and have to be drawn out as if it were from more recondite receptacles” [185:2008]. 
According to John Locke “for the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having many Ideas 
under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository, to lay up those 
Ideas, which at another time it might have use of” [150:1979]. !
!
!
2.5! Memory-Markers in Representative Realism!
!
A store-house, or any other spatial metaphor is an attractive metaphor, but it will not help much to 
explain memory. One cannot explain where exactly these images are stored when we are not 
examining them. While introducing the metaphor John Locke says that the metaphor “signifies no 
more but this, that the mind has a power, in many cases, to revive perception it has once had, with 
this additional perception annexed to them-that it it has had them before.” One objection raised 
here is that an event that has already happened cannot be revived. This was initially pointed out by 
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Thomas Reid. Reid says, “it seems to me as difficult to revive things that have ceased to be 
anything, as to lay them up in a repository, or to bring them out of it. When a thing is once 
annihilated, the same thing cannot be again produced, though another thing similar to it 
may” [284:2002]. This means that the memory-image is not a revived image, but a wholly new one 
which resembles the original experience. The question then is how to tell that an image resembles 
or represents the original experience. We saw that the image is not a feature that is exclusive to 
genuine-memory. An image is possible in the case of imagination or in the case of incorrect 
memory. This means that we need something to tell us that a particular image is a memory-image 
and not an instance of imagination. There should be a mark in the image, a memory-indicator to 
distinguish it from the other images.!
!
Hume’s criterion of vivacity of the image, was an attempt to answer this question. This criterion, 
helps us to distinguish the ideas of memory and the ideas of imagination. Those images that 
appear in the mind with force and vivacity are that of memory and those without the force and 
vivacity, which are perfect ideas, are imagination. But such an introspective criterion alone is not 
enough for the subject to determine whether an experience is a memory experience or not. In a lot 
of instances our imagination about a particular experience might be a lot stronger and livelier than 
our remembering. Hume is aware of this and he introduces a second criterion, the order and form 
of the original impression: “the imagination is not restrain’d to the same order and form with the 
original impressions; while the memory is in a manner ty’d down in that respect, without any power 
of variation” [12:2000].!
!
There are various problems with these criteria. Firstly, our imagination-image could be much 
stronger than the memory-image. I can imagine a character from a novel I read far more vividly 
and intensely than a memory-image of a person whom I had met in my early childhood. The 
memory-image can be faint and languid. The imagination-image could be strong and intense. The 
second criteria of order and form will not help either. While I remember an event, I can bring back 
the event to my mind in any order. When I remember a play that I had seen, I might at first 
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remember the last act of the play and then might remember the beginning of it. From the memory-
markers that Hume suggests, we cannot decide whether an image is a memory-image.!
!
Hume’s account of memory is heavily criticised for these memory-markers. John Passmore while 
analysing Hume’s account of memory says that the inconsistencies of these memory markers 
“reach epic proportions” [2013:94]. Similarly James Noxon says, “there is no need of an extended 
argument merely to prove that [Hume’s theory is] defective” [271:1976].!
!
Another important attempt to distinguish a memory-image from other images, was by Bertrand 
Russell. According to Bertrand Russell [163:2007], two characteristics of an image makes an 
image a memory-image. First, is the feeling of Familiarity. Familiarity gives the feeling that “this has 
happened”. But the feeling of familiarity alone cannot provide one with knowledge of the past, as 
this is a feeling, which is capable of existing without an object. For example, we might often find a 
situation familiar, but might fail to recognise exactly what is familiar about it.  Thus, Russell 
introduces the second characteristic of a memory-image: a feeling of Pastness. This is the 
characteristic, which makes the subject regard the image as referring to the past, so that the 
subject can assign places to the image in the order of time. That is, it is from this feeling of 
pastness that one gets the knowledge of the temporal relation of the event to the present, and to 
the other events in the context, the events remembered. Thus, to remember 1) one should have an 
image and 2) the image should be marked with the feelings of familiarity and the feelings of 
pastness. From these feelings, one formulate a belief that this belongs to the past, where “this” is a 
vague term which applies to both the remembered event and to the memory image. But even these 
feelings are inadequate to distinguish memory image from other images. If we vividly imagine an 
event - say dining with a celebrity - very often, and after a few years confuse this imagination with 
memory, chances are that the image that we bring to mind will have ‘feelings of familiarity' and 
‘feelings of pastness.’ !
!
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Memory-markers are an inadequate way to distinguish memory-images from other images. In fact 
there is no way in which we can distinguish a memory-image from other images, from the 
characteristics of the image alone. We saw that, strictly speaking, the representational 
characteristic of an image comes from the way we interpret the image and that this is not a feature 
of the image itself. This means that, the image alone, does not help us much. We need information 
beyond the image to conclusively determine whether the said image is a true representation of the 
past. To check the accuracy of the memory-image, one will have to step out of the image and then 
reflect upon the image. If remembering is simply a matter of having an image, as Russell and 
Hume claims, this is not possible. !
!
A second objection to the image-centric view is that, there are reported cases of experiential 
remembering which are completely devoid of any images. One of the early studies on this was 
done by Francis Galton in the 1880’s. Some of the subjects reported that their mental events are 
“clear and bright”. One of the subject is reported to have said that “I can see in my mind’s eye just 
as well as if I was beholding the scene with my real eye.” Another subject says, “My impressions 
are in all respects so dim, vague and transient, that I doubt whether they can reasonably be called 
images.” Some, however, have no images at all. One of them says, “To my consciousness there is 
almost no association of memory with objective visual impressions. I recollect the breakfast table, 
but do not see it.” (As quoted by Schwitzgebel, [40-41:2002]). It is not right to say that the subjects 
in Dalton’s study cannot have experiential memory. Even without an image, one can remember 
something. For example, suppose I spent some time sitting in a large, silent, dark room. I can at a 
later time remember sitting in that room and form a (visual) image of myself sitting in that room. But  
this image will be imaginary, for I was sitting in a silent room, in darkness.  Image, as argued by a 6
representative realist, is not necessary in such cases of experiential remembering.!
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 This is an example from John Pollock [187:1974] His argument is that in the cases where image 6
is absent, experiential memory consists in having very detailed propositional memory. His example 
is his memory of developing a photographic film in a darkroom. Pollock goes on to say that “my 
remembering developing the film consists simply of my remembering in considerable detail what 
happened, and that is propositional memory.” But here, there can be other images - tactual or 
auditory ones. It need not be a propositional memory.
!
!
2.6! Direct Realism!
!
The above difficulties with a representative theory of memory, motivate some philosophers to 
argue for a theory where an intermediary is not required while remembering. According to them, we 
can have a direct access to the past while we remember. What appears in the mind is not a 
representation of the past, but the past itself. In representative realism, to distinguish memory-
image from other images, we will have to go beyond the image. Only then can we conclusively 
determine whether the said image is a true representation of the past. Direct realists attempt to do 
this. According to them, while remembering, the subject’s mental entity is something about the 
past. That is, the mental entity is not an intermediary, but is intentional.  the recollection is about 
the past: it is a representation of some past fact or event. Many questions that a representative 
realist encounters will disappear in this view which holds that we have a direct awareness of the 
past. There is nothing that mediates one’s access to the past, which means there are no questions 
about the nature and characteristics of an intermediary image representation, and the relationship 
between this image and the past.!
!
Among early modern philosophers, Thomas Reid argued for such a direct realist view of memory. 
Rejecting Hume’s and Locke’s representative claims, Reid says that we have “an immediate 
knowledge of things past” by memory. “Suppose that once, and only once, I smelled a tuberose 
[and] next day I relate what I saw and smelled. When I attend as carefully as I can do what passes 
in my mind in this case, it appears evident that the very thing I saw yesterday, and the fragrance I 
smelled, are now the immediate objects of my mind, when I remember it. Upon the strictest 
attention, memory appears to me to have things that are past, and not present ideas, for its 
object” [28:2000]. According to J Laird, another direct realist, “memory does not mean the 
existence of present representations of past things, it is the mind’s awareness of past things 
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themselves” [56:1920]. Here, we are bringing back the past event to the abstract space of mind. 
Mind is seen as a boundless expanse, where a past event can be brought back and examined. !
!
It is to be noted that the direct contact one has with a past event is different from the direct contact 
one has with an event while perceiving it. The relation one has with an event while perceiving that 
event is not the same as while remembering that event. Perception is public and neutral. While we 
remember, memory reveals things that are public and neutral too. But it can be said that the object 
of memory is a little more personal and private than the object of perception.!
!
Firstly, in perception, one is not aware of the intrinsic features of one’s experience, whereas, in 
memory, one is aware of such features. In perception, it is generally held that when you perceive 
X, you do not experience any features of X as intrinsic features of your experience. You are never 
aware of features of your own perceptual experience. This view, ‘transparency of perceptual 
experience’ as it is commonly called, is held by those who argue against sense-data. Harman 
says, “when Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as 
features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her 
experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her 
experience” [39:1990]. Similarly, Michael Tye says, “Focus your attention on the scene before your 
eyes and on how things look to you. […] In seeing these surfaces, you are immediately and directly 
aware of a whole host of qualities. You may not be able to name or describe these qualities but 
they look to you to qualify the surfaces. You experience them as being qualities of the surfaces. 
None of the qualities of which you are directly aware in seeing the various surfaces look to you to 
be qualities of your experience. You do not experience any of these qualities as qualities of your 
experience” [137-138:2002]. In memory however, we are aware of the intrinsic features of the 
experience. Experiential memory involves qualitative experiences. One of the defining 
characteristics of experiential memory is that, the remembered experience comes back with the 
past emotions and feelings. The rememberer relives/re-experiences the past while remembering. 
The point is that, in perception, one is not aware of the intrinsic features of the experience and in 
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memory, one is aware of the intrinsic features. In perception, all that one experiences is the 
publicly observable qualities of worldly objects and events. In memory, one experiences the 
qualities as qualities of one’s own experience. In this sense, perception is public, and memory 
private. 
 
Secondly, memory is a private and subjective experience. Paul Ricoeur asks, “why should memory 
be attributed only to me, to you, to her or to him, in the singular of the three grammatical persons 
capable of referring to themselves, of addressing another as you (in the singular), or of recounting 
the deeds of a third party in a narrative in the third person singular? And why could the attribution 
not made directly to us, to you in the plural, to them?” [93: 2004]. There is nothing incoherent or 
paradoxical in a statement like “we are watching a film” or “we are listening to the radio”. But in 
memory things are different. When the remembered event is from the past, (consider the statement 
“we remember watching a film last year”) one cannot say that without verifying it from the other 
person. The correctness condition for the statement like “We remember watching a film”, is not the 
same as the correctness condition for the statement “we are watching a film.” Memory is a private 
possession, the features of which are intrinsic to the experience, which cannot be shared. This 
tradition which Ricoeur calls the “tradition of inwardness”, finds its first expression in St Augustine. 
In his Confessions, St Augustine writes, “Mind is the very memory itself” [191:2008]. It has not only 
influenced the philosophical discussions on memory, but also the psychological discussions on 
memory. Schacter, for example, says that “Our memories belong to us, They are uniquely ours, not 
quite like those of anybody else” [15:1996]. Paul Ricoeur lists three features which emphasise the 
private character of memory. Firstly, the memories of one person cannot be transferred into the 
memories of another. My memories and what I remember are not your memories or what you 
remember. Secondly, memory links one’s consciousness with one’s past. By this feature, memory 
assures the temporal continuity and the personal identity of a person. Thirdly, a sense of 
orientation in the passage of time is linked to memory. These are the features exclusive to memory.!
!
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While attempting to fill the explanatory gaps in a representative theory of memory, Direct realism 
comes with its own set of problems. The chief questions a direct realist will have to answer are: 1) 
How can the subject have an immediate knowledge of a past event now, at the time of 
remembering as the past event cannot exist now. 2) The subject cannot remember more than what 
he perceived. In this sense, memory is restricted by perception. If the subject can have a direct 
access to the past, how can it be restricted by perception? 3) Direct realists do not reject “memory 
images” altogether. (Woozley, Broad, Russell ) They interpret “images” in a different way. What is 7
the status of “images” in a direct realist view? Can we compare this image with the past? I will 
analyse the above questions. My conclusion will be that direct realism fails to convincingly answer 
these problems.!
!
!
2.7! Immediate Knowledge of Past!
!
While analysing Reid’s views on memory, Sir William Hamilton writes, “An immediate knowledge of 
the past is a contradiction. For we can only know a thing immediately, if we know it in itself, or as 
existing.  But what is past cannot be known in itself, for it is non-existent” [211:1855]. Hamilton’s 
point is that one cannot have immediate knowledge about a thing that does not exist. What is 
immediately known while remembering is not the actual event, but something numerically different 
from it. About mediate-immediate distinction, Hamilton says: “A thing is known immediately or 
proximately when we cognise it in itself; mediately or remotely, when we cognise it in or through 
something numerically different from itself” [488:1855]. Because an event in past do not exist now, 
we cannot have an immediate knowledge of that event now. !
!
But Reid was aware of this. While analysing Locke’s views on memory, Reid says, “But it seems to 
me as difficult to revive things that have ceased to be anything, as to lay them up in a repository or 
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 In The Problems of Philosophy [1912] Russell held a direct realist view. Later in The Analysis of 7
Mind [1921], he changed his position to a representative realist view.
to bring them out of it. When a thing is once annihilated, the same thing cannot be again produced, 
though another thing similar to it may.” Clearly, the mediate-immediate distinction, as explained by 
Hamilton, was different from the one Reid had in his mind. !
!
We can approach the mediate-immediate distinction in another way. According to  René van 
Woudenberg, “mediate knowledge involves reasoning (or argument), whereas immediate 
knowledge does not. Knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem, for instance, is mediate; for, in order 
to "see" (and hence to know) that the theorem is true, one has to engage in reasoning. We don't 
immediately "see" its truth. Memory knowledge, by contrast, is immediate; in the typical cases of 
memory one doesn't engage in reasoning (inductively, deductively, etc.)” [119-120:1999]. It is safe 
to assume that Reid had this distinction in mind when he spoke about immediate knowledge. Reid 
was aware of the mediate-immediate distinction held by Hamilton as he uses that distinction to 
argue against Locke’s views. In this view, one can have an immediate knowledge about the past 
while remembering, as one is not engaged in reasoning. If S sees a birthday gift that he got two 
years back, and remembers the birthday party he had two years back, his knowledge about the 
party is not based on any reasoning. In this sense his memory knowledge is immediate.!
!
But this will not solve the problem. According to a direct realist, the knowledge of the past is not 
only immediate, but it is direct too. If the past is directly present to the mind while remembering, 
then the question remains, how an event, which has ceased to exist, can directly present itself 
before mind while remembering. AD Woozley, John Laird and CD Broad have attempted to explain 
this.!
!
How can one have an immediate and direct awareness of something that does not exist now? 
John Laird, held a direct realist view of memory, and he tries to answer this question. Laird does 
not see any contradiction in holding that we can have a direct acquaintance with a time which is 
beyond the present. Laird rejects the claim that there is any contradiction in having an immediate 
knowledge of the past. According to Laird, there are two reasons for this. Firstly, one can 
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immediately apprehend a statement “good differs from bad as heaven from hell”. Immediate 
apprehension is possible even in the case of things that do not exist at all. Goodness and badness 
are universals and universals do not exist, they only subsist. Secondly, existence is not confined to 
the present existence. Existence means the whole of existence and not just the present existence. 
Past events have their determinate place in the series of existence. Laird proceeds to say, “we 
must refuse to be deluded by the fable that the past cannot be directly discovered because it is 
dead, or that there is any contradiction in holding that direct acquaintance extends beyond the 
present” [50:1920].!
!
AD Woozley, another direct realist, held similar arguments. According to Woozley, the argument 
that what is past cannot be directly known in the present is not based on empirical facts. No cases 
can be cited which suggest that the immediate object of remembering is clearly not the object 
remembered. Woozley says that this theory, the theory that the past cannot be directly known in 
the present, is a theory about the nature of time. “It is supposed that when something happens, it 
has then happened, and is thereafter as unavailable for subsequent observation as it was for 
previous observation before it happened, just as if I do not see lightning flash when it occurs I 
cannot hope to see it afterwards (for it is no longer there to see)” [58:1949]. Even in the case of 
perception, what is perceived is not contemporary with the act of perceiving it. An astronomer, 
using his telescope might see an explosion of a distant star as happening in the present, an event 
which is clearly not contemporary with the act of perception.!
!
Thus, the argument that one cannot have an immediate knowledge of past is seen as an argument 
regarding the nature of time. Firstly, if this is a theory about the nature of time, then the same 
argument should extend to the future events too. That is, if one can have a direct access to a past 
event, if a past event is available thus, then the future events should be available too. If a present 
event can fall outside the present, and if one can have an immediate knowledge about such 
events, then, logically, one should have immediate knowledge about future events too. In his 
analysis of memory, Reid is aware of this difficulty. But Reid cannot give a satisfactory answer and 
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says that “I can give no reason why I should have the one [immediate knowledge of past] and not 
the other [immediate knowledge of the future] but that such is the will of my maker” [255:2010]. 
Woozley’s account too does not explain how one is possible and the other is not.!
!
Secondly, Woozley rests his argument on the views held by CD Broad. In his The Mind and its 
place in nature, Broad says: “It appears to me that, once an event has happened, it exists 
eternally; all that happens henceforth to it is that, as more and more events occur and take their 
permanent place in the ever-lengthening temporal order of the universe, it retreats into the more 
and more distant past. If an event ceased to exist as soon as it ceased to be present it plainly 
could no longer stand in any relations to anything” [252:1925]. Two objections can be raised 
against Broad’s argument. Firstly, an event is a changes. To say that an event happened, is to say 
that something changed. What changed might exist eternally, but the change itself cannot exist 
eternally. A change is having a certain duration and a certain position in time. To say that someone 
retired from his office is to say that someone went through a change or changes that retirement 
consists in. He was in his job, and then he was not. It would be nonsensical to say then that after 
his retirement, the event of retirement exists eternally. Secondly, Broad suggests that if an event 
ceases to exist, it cannot stand in any relation to anything. This is wrong. When we say that an 
event ceases to exist, we do not mean that the event, or the changes that happened, has 
disappeared altogether. It just means that the event has happened and thus it ceases from the 
present existence and that we cannot reproduce the same event anymore. !
!
!
2.8! Memory and Perception!
!
Memory of an event is restricted by the perception of that event. I cannot now remember 
something about an experience, which I had not perceived in the past. Memory’s direct 
acquaintance with past cannot explain this limitation. If I am once again being acquainted with the 
past, such a limitation cannot be explained.!
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Among those philosophers who held a direct realist view, CD Broad discusses this point. According 
to Broad, when I perceive an event, I can perceive only those things that produce sensations in 
me. What is perceived is being determined by the factors that are personal to the one who is 
experiencing the event. In this sense, perception is essentially private in character; not public and 
neutral. The fact that we can remember only the things and events, which we perceived, is a 
similar restriction. “In each case the class of objects perceived or remembered is determined by 
factors which are personal to the experient; but each of the individual members of the class may 
still be of such a nature that a number of experients could perceive or remember it” [228:1925].!
!
This explanation, that the perception itself is restricted by personal factors and hence private in 
character, will not solve the problem. All that this would say is something about the private 
character of the perceived or remembered event.  There is something personal about perceiving 
an event, and that personal factor will not bring in any special privacy in the perceived event. 
Similarly, such a personal factor will not bring in a special privacy into the object of memory too. 
This is what Broad suggests. But this will not explain how the subject can have direct awareness of 
a past event, but still cannot access those characteristics that he had not perceived in the past. i.e, 
Broad’s views will not explain why memory is restricted by perception.!
!
According to an externalist view of direct realism, when we perceive an event, “external objects 
and their properties shape the contours of the subject’s conscious experience.” [MGF Martin, 
64:2004]. “They shape the contours of the subject’s conscious experience, by actually being the 
contours of the subject’s conscious experience” [Fish, 6:2010].!
!
Often, when we remember an event, we might get a few things about the past event wrong; the 
details which we had not perceived during the event. For example, when I remember a cricket 
match, I might remember that the umpire was wearing a pair of brown shoes and a white coat but 
might not remember the colour of his bow tie. The “image” that I have in my mind might come with 
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a red bow tie, but I can truthfully say that the colour of his bow tie was not red. If I have a direct 
acquaintance with the past, and if past perception of the event does not shape my experience, in 
such cases, I should be able to examine the event, and come up with the correct details. i.e, my 
memory object should come with the right colour of the tie.  !
!
Woozley is aware of this problem. His solution is that “although the materials of remembering are 
always originals, they do not need to be the originals which I think they are” [63:1949]. That is, 
when I am remembering the cricket match and the umpire, I am mixing up two different originals, 
the umpire and another man who wore a red bow tie, “who on that or some other occasion 
associated with [red bow tie] in my mind” [63:1949]. This argument is unconvincing. If when I 
remember a particular event, what comes to my mind is a collage of various things that I had seen 
in the past, then the word “original” becomes corrupt. I am then not having a direct acquaintance 
with that particular past event and my mind is conjuring up an image (image in the representative 
sense) which is similar to that of the particular event that I am trying to remember.!
!
John Laird’s views are similar. Laird says that “remembered things are not apprehended so fully as 
things perceived, but, on the other hand, the scope of memory is wider than the scope of 
perception.” It is probable that some reconstruction accompanies the subject’s recollection and 
blend with it. If while remembering the cricket match, the umpire appears in my mind with a red 
bow tie, it is because my mind reconstructs the colour of the bow tie and this reconstruction is 
blended with my recollection of the cricket match. Here again, the problem is that one cannot say 
what are the details that are reconstructed by the mind, and what are the details that are directly 
apprehended. It would be problematic to say that memory always involves reconstruction, and that 
the subject cannot say what is reconstructed and what is directly apprehended. The subject can 
“reconstruct” a whole cricket match, with very little details that he remembers about the match. 
Would it still be right to say that he remembers the match? I think not. Both Woozley and Laird fail 
to explain why memory of an event is restricted by the past perception of that event.!
!
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2.9! Memory Images in Direct Realism!
!
A direct realist view of memory does not reject images altogether. According to Woozley, images 
are not things which are different from their originals. The puzzles that a representative theorist 
tries to solve arise because he is treating them as different. The “images” are past experiences and 
to treat them like the reflections in a mirror is a mistake.  When we examine those “images” that 
appears in the mind when we remember, we can see that they are quite different from those 
images that we see in our daily life, i.e., images/reflections in water, mirror or glass. These images/
reflections appear in the exact same way as their originals, but the objects in these cases are of a 
different kind, they are numerically different, and they have different spatial locations. The relation 
between the original and the image in such cases are completely different from the relation 
between the past event and what appears in our mind when we remember. We are having a direct 
contact with the original when we remember. In this sense, to treat images as a present entity is a 
mistake. G.F. Stout says, “In remembering a past experience, I do not, normally, discriminate the 
memory-image from the experience remembered” [9:1905]. Similar views are expressed by Don 
Locke, in his analysis of realism. “[…] What we call the memory-image is not a present existent at 
all, but is the past event or experience itself as it appears to us in our remembering” [23:1971].!
!
But there is another sense in which some direct realists treat images. Bertrand Russell and H.H. 
Price, while analysing a direct realist view, talks about images in the representative sense, i.e., 
something that re-presents the past. Bertrand Russell says that “there is some danger of confusion 
as to the nature of memory, owing to the fact that memory of an object is apt to be accompanied by 
an image of the object, and yet the image cannot be what constitutes memory… Moreover, we are 
certainly able to some extent to compare our image with the object remembered, so that we often 
know, within somewhat wide limits, how far our image is accurate; but this would be impossible 
unless the object, as opposed to the image, were in some way before the mind” [66:1998]. HH 
Price expresses a similar view when he writes: “if we can detect [the inadequacy of memory 
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images] and correct it, surely we must have some direct acquaintance with the past events 
themselves” [309:1969].!
!
Price’s view that we can compare and correct a memory image is based on the ‘negative-memory-
situations’ discussed by EJ Furlong, in his work A study in Memory. The case that Furlong presents 
is this:!
!
Let us take an example of the situation to which I refer. Suppose that our neighbour has acquired a 
new garden-gate which we are invited to examine. We notice various things about it; its colour, 
shape, material, height. Later on, when we remember the gate, we find that there are certain 
details we can recall, and certain others we cannot. We can recall, say, the colour and the height, 
but if we are asked how many vertical bars the gate contained we may at a loss for a reply. Still, if 
someone were to suggest that there were three bars we might well repudiate this answer, 
declaring, No, the number certainly wasn’t three. We might similarly refuse to accept twenty. Thus 
we do seem to know what the number was not. Now how do we know this? It would seem that we 
must have some kind of contact with the past: we must in some way know what the details of that 
past situation were [32-33:1951]. The suggestion is that, though we do not know the number of 
bars in the gate, we know what the number was not. This means that apart from the image and the 
details provided by the representation, we have some other contact with the past. !
!
It is a fact that in this case, we will be able to say what the number was not, though we might not 
be able to give the correct number. But then to suggest that we are able to do this because we 
have some other contact with the past, would be going too far. We reject the numbers three or 
twenty because these numbers do not fit with the image we have with us; not because we have 
some other contact with the past. We might not be able to reject a number which is close to the 
actual number of bars that the garden-gate had. If someone were to suggest that there were ten 
bars in the gate, we might not be able to accept it or reject it. Surely we will be able to say that the 
image that we have is inadequate, but the inadequacy is drawn from the image itself, and not 
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through another contact with the past bypassing the image. We are able to say that the image is 
imperfect by focusing on the image itself, not by comparing it with another entity. If there is an 
image, and if we can compare that image with another entity, that means memory is split into two. 
However, this is not possible. Moreover, there is no need to look into an image while remembering 
if we have access to something else which is more reliable. !
!
!
2.10! Memory Traces!
!
The trace theory tries to answer the question, how does recollection physically operate. The 
motivation for this theory is not philosophical in nature. Nor is the theory trying to answer 
philosophical questions about memory. They are mostly, scientific questions. However, it will be 
helpful to go through this theory, as it has some interesting observations about some of the 
questions raised against representative realism and direct realism.!
!
Trace theory investigates how information is stored in one’s brain. The widely advocated view 
among neurologists is that the encoding and storage happens via engrams or memory traces. 
Engrams are “sum total of changes in the brain that first encoded an experience and that then 
constitute the record of an experience” [Squire & Kandel, 78:2009]. The changes that happen in 
the brain are changes in the nerve cells. The changes are the “structural modifications at synapses 
(i.e., the area where the axion of one neuron connects with the dendrite of another neuron) that 
affect the ease with which neurons in a neural network can activate each other” [Bernecker, 
179:2001]. !
!
The existence of traces are important to philosophy in more than one way. Firstly, it will help us 
explain the nature and status of the representations. Traces can be treated as representations - 
something that tells us about the past. Secondly, and more importantly, this will help us explain the 
causation involved in remembering. (Explained in Chapter 4.)!
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In representative view, there are two steps involved in the process of remembering. Firstly, the 
rememberer is conscious of the image. Secondly, the rememberer then interprets the past event 
from this image. This motivates some philosophers to claim that the representative view is a form 
of dualism [Woozley, 40:1949]. This dualism poses another problem. To become aware of the 
image as an image, to describe the image and to determine the characteristics of the image, we 
will have to step out of the image and reflect upon the image. Sartre, in his work The Imaginary, 
says that “the image as image is describable only by a second-order act in which the look is turned 
away from the object and directed at the way in which the object is given. It is this reflective act that 
permits the judgement, ‘I have an image’” [5:1940].!
!
In remembering, however, we do not engage in such a second-order act. When I remember a 
parade that I saw earlier, I do not look inside, see an image and then consciously interpret that 
image to give the description of that parade. There is only one act, and that is being aware of the 
parade itself. I am not giving a description of the image when I give a description of the parade. !
!
There is one way to overcome this objection. The argument that the representative theory is a form 
of dualism is raised against the form of representative view where the nature of the representation 
or the image is ambiguous. That is, these are mental items of which the ontological status is 
unclear. [Sutton: 282:2010]!
!
If we treat the representations as actual physical items that we are just not aware of, then many of 
these questions will disappear. Consider memory-traces as representations. For the rememberer, 
there is no need to go beyond this representation to be aware of the past. That is, memory involves 
a representation of the past, but it need not involve an awareness of the representation itself. We 
are not conscious of the traces when we remember an episode from the past. The ‘interpretation’ 
of these traces and the translation of these traces to the information about the past event, happens 
unconsciously. We need not go beyond ‘the given’ and in this sense, remembering is direct. Since 
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we are not aware of the representations and since we are not consciously interpreting the 
representations, this view is similar to the direct realist position too. In this sense, it can be treated 
as an alternative to both representative and realist theories. (For a similar view on perception, see 
Schwartz, 1996)!
!
!
2.11! Conclusion!
!
Both representative realism and direct realism have its own set of problems and do not 
convincingly provide an explanation as to why, from a subjective point of view, it is difficult to 
distinguish between memory and imagination. The theories that are examined are primarily 
theories that attempt to explain experiential memory. No event or experience is called back to the 
mind in propositional memory or habit memory. In the case of propositional memory, remembering 
consists in a successful performance. A theory which tries to include propositional memory - copy 
theory - will be examined in the next chapter.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 3!
!
COPY THEORY OF MEMORY!
!
!
!
3.1! Introduction!
!
We saw that representative realism and direct realism primarily deals with experiential memory. In 
the case of propositional memory, one is not re-experiencing anything. As Ayer remarks, success 
of propositional memory consists in getting the answer, getting the remembered proposition right 
[137:1990]. It will not be correct to say that the subject is having an image in his mind while 
remembering a proposition. Nor will it be correct to say that the past appears in the subject’s mind 
while remembering that p. We also saw that one cannot remember something, just by having a 
representation or an image in his mind. Images are not an exclusive feature of memory. The image 
has to faithfully copy or reproduce the past, for it to be a memory image. In both representative 
realism and direct realism, the subject stores information in a mental storehouse, and later, while 
remembering, retrieves the information. That is, memory is treated like a passive device. In 
contrast to this view is ‘activism’ which says that memory is a reconstructive process. In this 
chapter, I will analyse these views. !
 !
A statement “S remembers that p” implies that p. Remembering that p entails that p. Memory is 
factive. One cannot remember that p, without p being the case. This is true not just in the case of 
propositional memory, it is true in the case of experiential memory too. Someone cannot remember 
his birthday party and the songs that were played in that party if there was no birthday party at all. 
This motivates some philosophers to claim that memory is much like a device that copies and 
reproduces the information that was acquired in the past. In this chapter I would like to examine 
this model of memory and the arguments given for and against this model. Recent discussions in 
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psychology have come to argue against this model of memory and do not see memory as a merely 
passive device anymore. However, in the philosophical discussions, passivism is deeply 
entrenched and advocated. I examine some of the arguments presented against the model which 
consider memory as a passive device and examine the flaws of such arguments.!
!
!
3.2! Memory is Factive!
!
One cannot remember that p, unless p. Similarly, one cannot remember an event unless that event 
has in fact happened. One can only remember those experiences or facts which form part of one’s 
own previous experiences - facts learned or events experienced in the past. Yet we think that we 
often wrongly remember a past event or a fact. Such wrong memories can happen for a number of 
reasons. Sometimes it can happen through no fault of memory at all. An example suggested by 
GEM Anscombe is the case of someone who mistakes a wax figure for a person, and later claims 
that he saw a person. A similar example is suggested by Von Leyden, where the subject sees a 
crowd panicking in the street and believes it to be a part of film shooting. He later claims that he 
saw the shooting of a film in the street. In both these cases the subjects are wrong in their claims. 
Yet, in both these cases, their memory is not at fault. But this is not the only reason for a false 
memory. !
!
Memory states are not transparent to the subject. One cannot, by introspection alone, determine 
whether one is having an episode of memory. One needs information beyond what is available 
through introspection to distinguish memory from imagination. !
!
That one’s memory state is one of remembering is not transparent from a first-person perspective. 
Knowledge is not transparent from a first person perspective either. In the case of knowledge, the 
subject cannot always distinguish between belief and knowledge from introspection alone. One 
needs to know that the proposition he believes is true. That is, one needs to have more information 
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than that is available through just introspection. In the case of visual perception, to know that one is 
seeing x, one needs more information than that is available through introspection. One needs to 
know that it is in fact x that one is seeing. !
!
Because memory cannot be distinguished from imagination from introspection alone, one may run 
into many problems while appealing to memory of past experiences. Bernecker [11:2008] lists the 
following risks that one might encounter while doing this:!
!
1. Fault of the past perception: The subject may remember having seen a dog on the sofa; but 
what he in fact saw was a cat. Here memory is not at fault. The cases suggested by Anscombe 
and Leyden fall into this category.!
2. Fault of the memory: The subject may recollect having thought he saw a dog on the sofa; but 
what he really thought he saw at the time was a cat. Here, memory is to be blamed and not the 
past perception.!
3. Fault of the memory and perception (i): The subject may recollect having seen a dog on the 
sofa, but what he really thought he saw at the time was a cat and the perception at the time 
was false for there was no cat but a squirrel on the sofa.!
4. Fault of the memory and perception (ii): The subject may claim to remember having seen a dog 
on the sofa, but what he thought he saw, at the time, was a cat but the perception at the time 
was false as in fact it was a dog that he saw on the sofa.!
!
!
3.3! Copy Theory of Memory:!
!
A memory claim has to satisfy the truth condition to become genuine memory. At t2 S remembers 
that p only if p was true at t1 and p is true at t2. As memory is factive, and as one cannot remember 
something which is not true, some philosophers hold a view that memory is a passive input-output 
device, which reproduces a copy of the past thoughts and experiences. Philosophers who take 
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memory to be a passive device for storing and retrieving information holds that the present thought 
content should be type-identical with the past thought content. This model of memory has been 
called “Xerox model of memory” [Bernecker, 144:2008], “passivism” [Casey, 15:2000] and “copy 
theory” [Brewer, 26:1988]. !
!
An early version of the copy theory of memory was first proposed by Aristotle in his De Memoria. 
Aristotle compares a memory image with the image sealed by a signet ring in hot wax. From there 
emerged an entire tradition in which memory is reduced to a process of registering and storing 
impressions. This tradition is still very much alive.!
!
Some philosophers say that the past thought content is the same as the present thought content. It 
is stored in a repository and retrieved later. This is evident in Plato’s metaphor of aviary, where we 
search for memories of our past. St. Augustine says “when I am in this storehouse [of memory], I 
ask that it produce what I want to recall, and immediately certain things come out; some things 
require a longer search, and have to be drawn out as if it were from more recondite receptacles”.
[185:2008]. According to John Locke, “for the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having 
many Ideas under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository, to lay 
up those Ideas, which at another time it might have use of” [150:1979]. This would mean that the 
past thought content and the present thought content are essentially the same. That is, the content 
is not duplication but the original past thought content itself. An objection to this, first raised by 
Thomas Reid, is that the same things, ideas, thoughts that have ceased to exist cannot be brought 
back.. As Reid puts it, “When a thing is once annihilated, the same thing cannot be again 
produced, though another thing similar to it may” [284:2002]. One answer to this objection would 
be that the past experience/thoughts are stored in the repository and later revitalised/brought back. 
But then, the “store house” will not be a metaphor, and one will have to explain the storage 
process. Locke himself says that the repository is a metaphor [151:1979]. When the storage 
process/repository is seen as a metaphor, we will have to agree that the present thought is not the 
same as the past thought, but a reproduction of it.!
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!
 The idea here is that the information that one learned in the past is the same as the information 
recalled in the present. Malcolm makes this explicit. Memory, says Malcolm, “is the retention of 
knowledge. One knew something and still knows it. The present knowledge in memory is the same 
as previous knowledge.” Such views also echo copy theory as, here again, memory is seen as a 
passive device which registers and retains incoming information and later makes this information 
active. Here, memory is a reappearance or a revitalisation of an existing thought. But again, 
memory’s function is like an input-output device. Once the information gets in, it persists 
throughout and appears at a later time when the subject remembers.!
!
There is data from empirical experiments to support the copy theory. Analysing memories for 
surprising or shocking events (flashbulb memories), which the subjects experienced, shows that 
we have an ability to retain such memories with detailed clarity and vividness. Livingston 
[576:1967] calls this model “Now Print!”. When a trigger occurs, the subject recognises the novelty 
of the past event that is remembered and tests for the consequentiality of that event (or ‘biological 
meaning’), and gives a “Now Print!” instruction to his memory, after which the events and 
conduction activities are ‘printed’ in his mind. Livingston goes on to suggest that memory of an 
event of this nature copies details of the past in a photographic precision. Livingston says that if 
you have lived through the times of Kennedy assassination you can remember exactly where you 
were when you heard the news first, “with whom, and very likely whether you were sitting, 
standing, or walking - almost which foot was forward when your awareness become 
manifest” [576:1967]. Brown and Kulik [83:1977] backs this view and says that the clarity of the 
memory image is directly proportional to the degree of consequentiality and covert/overt rehearsals 
of the experienced event. Covert rehearsals refer to those kind of rehearsals one perform in one’s 
mind. The subject might call back the event to his mind many times, if it seems important for him. 
Overt rehearsals refer to those kind of rehearsals one perform while describing it to others. If the 
event seems important, chances are that the subject will share it with someone by verbally 
describing it.!
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This model of memory stands against the model of “activism” where memory-image and memory 
as such is not a duplication of the past thought, but an active reconstruction of the information. 
That is, memory reconstructs the past experience or thought and does not merely copy the past 
thought content. [Bartlett (1932), Janet (1928) , Bernecker (2008:144)] This reconstructive nature 8
of memory, they claim, is the reason behind the difficulty in distinguishing memory from imagination 
or confabulation.!
!
A reconstructive model of memory was first discussed by Frederic Bartlett in the 1930s. He argued 
that memory was fundamentally reconstructive. According to his model, people register and 
retrieve events and experiences in accordance with schemas, or general default features. When I 
think of a classroom, I tend to think of students, a teacher, chairs, tables and books. When I think 
of a forest, I tend to think of plants and trees, animals and birds. When we remember an event, we 
filter that event through these general impressions, and omit incompatible features and add details 
which are in accordance with the schema. Memory of an event will thus have a structure which it 
shares with the schema we possess. We combine the fragments that we remember with the 
schema and come up with a detailed, coherent picture of the event. This will help one to structure 
one’s memory in a better way for future cognitions. This will also help one to condense one’s 
memory and come up with a short summary of very large information.!
!
3.4! Arguments against the Copy Theory:!
!
If memory alters information received from the past, and if the reproduction of a past event is in 
any way different from the original event, it can be argued that the copy theory is incomplete. Some 
philosophers believe that memory changes the information it has received. One way in which 
memory alters the encoded information is by the way what David Kaplan calls Cognitive Dynamics. 
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 As quoted by Casey [15:2000]8
According to this view, a person needs to change his judgements to continue to believe the very 
same thing. That is, suppose if I see Bert being drunk in a party, my initial thought would be, “Bert 
is drunk”. However, the next day, I cannot remember “Bert is drunk”. My memory of the event 
would be that “Bert was drunk.” That is, one needs to vary one’s judgement so as to manifest the 
same belief. It is evident that such a variation will alter the thought content. My past thought 
content was “Bert is drunk” and my present thought content is “Bert was drunk.” My judgement 
about the event should be varied as I move in time, in order to keep my belief about the event.  
 
This argument is backed by Bernecker to refute the copy theory and Bernecker concludes: “With 
the passing of time, a propositional content changes like this: “S is F now” (original thought); “S 
was F a moment ago” (memory shortly after the original thought); “S was F a while back” (memory 
long after the original thought). If memory were purely a passive repository - as the xerox model 
maintains - it would not be allowed to adapt the tenses of verbs and the demonstratives included in 
the original thought contents an absurd conclusion” [148:2008].!
!
If the memory is preserved with some sort of a chronological index, this is still possible. The terms 
“a moment ago”, “a while back” and “a long while back” points to a certain time in the past, and all 
these terms refer to that time in the past. While retrieving a certain event from memory, it is not just 
the details of the event that is retrieved, but also the contextual information of that event which 
includes the temporal relation of that event to other events and the present time. Locke says that 
memory images come to the mind with an additional perception attached to them that, “it has had 
them before.” However, whether such additional perception or contextual information contains the 
exact time and place of the event, is a controversial issue.  Some scholars argue that the date and 
time is automatically tagged while the event is encoded in memory. (1979: Hasher and Zacks, 
1984: Zacks, Hasher, Alba, Sanft, and Rose, See also Tulving: 385:1972). But we often remember 
events from the past while having difficulty in judging the time at which they occurred. This 
motivates some to say that the contextual information that comes along with the retrieved event, 
does not include time and place of the event. (1993: Friedman, 1988: Davies and Thomson). But 
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even if the specific time at which the past event occurred is not part of the information retrieved, we 
treat a past event as having happened at a particular time in the past. The temporal relation of a 
particular event with other events some times help us in placing the event in its position. David 
Hume had this in mind when he says that the “chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the 
simple ideas, but their order and position.” The terms “now” or “a while back” or “a long time back”, 
all refer to the same position in the time, just like a photograph (or a copy of that) represents a 
certain time and place in the past. My judgement need not vary to keep my belief intact. Thus, this 
objection is not a threat to the copy theory of memory.!
!
Summarised Memories: Another objection to the copy theory is the presence of summarised 
memories. We often remember summarised events from our past. For example, when I remember 
my past year in Sheffield, I might not remember the exact specific events. When I remember last 
year’s weather and say, “I remember last year’s weather was good”, I am not remembering a 
specific day’s weather. My memory is about events which extend over a period of time. Marya 
Schechtman observes that the summarised memories are of two types. There are summarised 
event memories of lifetime periods, wherein one’s memory summarises a certain period of one’s 
life. I can remember the weather was good last year or my childhood was happy or I was lonely 
last year. These memories may include specific events but their relation to the past is much more 
complicated than the memory I have of a specific event, say my last birthday party. There are also 
summarised event memories of a certain event. I can remember the meeting I had with my friend 
last week, or a holiday I had, and can come up with condensed version of the event. These are 
summarised memories of particular events. In both cases, a one-on-one connection is almost 
impossible. Schechtman says,“how much similarity must there be between the two moments [the 
event and the subsequent memory of it] in order for the one to count as a memory of the other? 
How much of the content of the experience must be reproduced and how accurately? How many 
portions of the past is the present connected to in a condensed memory, and how is this 
determined? These are not easy questions to answer […]” [10:1994].!
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Bernecker argues that this poses a problem to the copy theory, as according to the copy theory 
memory output has a specific one-to-one connection with the inputs. The present memory of an 
event has a one-to-one connection with the past time in which this event was registered. 
Summarised memory does not have such a one-to-one connection with a specific past event. !
But this objection is weak if we treat memory summarisation as an inferential judgement that one 
makes. When I remember my favourite restaurant or that the weather was generally good, I make 
an inference based on specific events. The memory claim “the weather was generally good” is 
possible only if I remember some of the specific days, events or time in which weather was good. I 
remember that weather was good on these days, and I infer that weather was generally good. This 
does not pose a great difficulty for the copy theory of memory. A specific example that Bernecker 
makes is this: “I remember having disliked eating vegetables as a child. Though it is true that I 
used to dislike vegetables, at no time in my childhood did I (dispositionally) believe that I didn’t like 
vegetables. Rather that entertaining this general idea,what I thought was that I don’t like Brussels 
sprouts, that mangel is too bitter, carrots too sweet, that spinach has a disgusting texture, etc. The 
content of my comprehensive meta-representational memory, though no doubt correct, has no 
single counterpart in the past and therefore cannot count as a replica of a previous thought content 
of mine. It stems from amalgamation of a whole host of past thought contents” [148:2008]. Here, 
my thought that “I disliked eating vegetables as a child” is an inferential judgement. I remember, as 
a child I thought carrots are too sweet and mangel too bitter, and from there I infer that as a child I 
disliked vegetables. My memory about carrots and mangel still hold a one-to-one relationship to 
the past. The inference is based on these memories. This objection doesn’t pose a major threat to 
the copy theory.!
!
Bartlett raises another objection based on one of his experiments. A story about the native 
americans was told to a group of Cambridge students, and later when they recalled the story many 
details of the original story was omitted and some details were added to the story. As time passes 
by, the subjects omit more and more of the details and reconstruct many details. These details, 
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Bartlett concluded, was systematic, and comes from the cultural stereotypes the subjects are 
familiar with. For example an event of “hunting seals” was later recounted as “fishing” and “canoe” 
was changed to “boat.” Bartlett concludes that “remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable 
fixed lifeless and fragmentary traces but an imaginative reconstruction or construction”. Barclay 
and DeCooke (1988), in one of their experiments, asked the subjects to keep a journal of their day-
to-day experiences. They noted that the subjects later found it difficult to distinguish between their 
own experiences and those false notes added by the researchers. From the experiment, it was 
concluded that “Autobiographical recollections are not necessarily accurate, nor should they be; 
they are, however, mostly congruent with one's self-knowledge, life themes, or sense of 
self” [92:1988, Barclay & DeCooke].!
!
Such reconstruction, again, is not a threat to the the copy theory. One can still defend the copy 
theory by saying that, while parts of the recalled event are genuine in nature, the parts that are 
reconstructed are ostensible memory rather than genuine memory. The minor events and images 
that are reconstructed to get to the major events do not constitute genuine memory. But then, this 
would have the consequence that the mechanism of recollection is more fallible than we thought. !
!
Marya Schechtman writes, “Memory […] is not always, or only a reproduction of past experiences 
or a simple connection between two discrete moments of consciousness. It is also a way of 
weaving the facts about ourselves and our histories into a coherent and intelligible story, 
expressive of the overall contours of our characters and our lives; our autobiographical memory is, 
that is, more like a biography than a photo album. like a scientist who creates a continuous graph 
by drawing a line close to, but not necessarily in contact with, all the data points, our 
autobiographical memories draw a smooth storyline among the various experiences we have had - 
a storyline which is constrained by the bulk of those experiences, but which need not contain them 
exactly, and which gives our lives a narrative unity” [12:1994]. This narrative unity of one’s life in 
memory is the reason why one is able to look back into his past and come up with a short 
condensed version about a certain past event. When I remember a certain event, say a certain 
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meeting I had with a friend, I will not recall the entire meeting or the entire conversation we had. I 
will remember just the important points. The topic that we discussed, the drink we had and maybe 
the duration of the meeting. This condensation is a necessary feature that helps us to make sense 
of a remembered event. !
!
Barclay and DeCooke write, “As with allegory, autobiographical memory often is a constructive and 
reconstructive process used to condense everyday memories of events and activities, extracting 
those features that embrace and maintain meaning in one's self-knowledge system. In turn, 
seemingly unconnected episodic recollections become allegorical in that particular events can be 
remembered and used as instances of generalized life experiences to convey one's sense of self 
to an audience” [92:1988]. This would mean that remembering an event is not a matter of 
reproducing a copy, but a matter of weaving out a story from the things that were copied in the 
past. Schechtman makes this clear. Defending Barclay and DeCooke’s views, Schechtman writes, 
“If our autobiographical memories are the way we tell ourselves and others the story of our lives, a 
consideration of the way these memories really work suggests that we are rather subtle authors. 
We do not need to resort to crude, literal reproduction of our physical and psychological histories, 
but pick and choose the important elements, use sophisticated representational devices, and 
shape a story that can express what we take to be the basic and essential information about our 
lives” [12:2008].!
!
Note that such condensation of an event is different from the summarisation of a time period. In the 
case of a summarisation of time period, we are making an inferential judgement from a lot of 
remembered events. In the case of condensation of an event, we remember various facts and 
experiences from the past, filter it, and present a short version of the event. Such short versions of 
the events, help us to make a coherent life story, and a sense of self. Barclay and DeCooke 
remark, “Autobiographical recollections are not necessarily accurate, nor should they be; they are, 
however, mostly congruent with one's self-knowledge, life themes, or sense of self” [92:1988]. The 
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point is that such a memory summarisation is part of the function of memory. Remembering 
involves summarisation of the past information.!
!
Another objection against the copy theory is from Bernecker. He argues that in order to avoid 
cluttering our minds with redundant pieces of information, we need to avoid unimportant details of 
an events or experience, and compress the available information. “Since there is a limit to what 
one can remember and a limit to what one can retrieve from memory, it is vital to condense and 
compress the incoming information” [153:2008]. There are a lot of experiences that we go through, 
events witnessed and facts learned on an average day. This information has to be structured, 
compressed and summarised for memory to function smoothly.  Like memory condensation, 
avoiding clutter is also a feature of memory. !
!
!
3.5! Conclusion!
!
According to Copy theory of memory, memory’s function is to reproduce information that it once 
acquired. If the information reproduced varies from the information acquired, even slightly, then it 
will not be a case of genuine memory. It will mean that memory malfunctions. But summarisation of 
past events and avoidance of clutter is a part of the function of memory as shown above. These 
are compatible with the truth conditions of memory too. This would mean that copy theory is 
incomplete. Remembering involves summarisation and avoiding clutter.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 4!
!
CAUSATION IN MEMORY!
!
!
!
4.1! Introduction!
!
We saw that everything about a memory-experience is happening now, in the present. Yet the 
memory-experience refers to the past. It is through our present experiences that we access our 
past. To access the past through a present experience, there has to be a correspondence between 
the past and present cognitive states. This connection is necessary for the present state to be an 
instance of genuine memory. We know that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish memory from 
false-memory or imagination. A suitable connection between the past and present cognitive states 
will ensure that the present cognitive state is a case of genuine memory, and that it is not a case of 
imagination or false-memory. A connection between the past and present cognitive states is also 
necessary to distinguish relearning from remembering , and to guarantee that the present 9
representation is a case of remembering. There are various attempts to explain how the present 
cognitive state is connected to the past. Among these, the causal theory of memory, which holds 
that the representation of a past event is causally connected to the past, is the most widely held 
and the most prominent view.!
!
Most philosophers have now come to advocate a view, which holds that remembering implies an 
appropriate causal relation to the past. Contemporary philosophers claim that causal process is 
indispensable in memorial representation. Le Poidevin, for example, declares: “It would be hard to 
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 One can reduce learning to remembering. Plato in his work Meno holds that knowledge as such, 9
is grounded in recollection. In daily life, and in common sense notion of memory however, there is 
a sharp divide between remembering and recollection.
take seriously a theory of perceptual and memorial representation that did not assign a central role 
to causation”  [20:2007]. However, as with any philosophical view, there are considerable 
arguments raised against a causal process in memory. Also, there are disagreements among 
philosophers about how the causal process in memory should be construed. This has resulted in 
various versions of causal theory. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the notion of causality 
in memory. The questions discussed will be: Whether a causal process is necessary to connect a 
past representation with the present representation? What are the arguments for and against 
causal theory of memory? Are the arguments presented for a causal process good? Can memory 
traces act as causal intermediaries between a past experience and the subsequent recall? I 
conclude that the chief arguments for causal theory of memory come with certain difficulties.  I also 
conclude that the alternate accounts to the causal theory are flawed. A causal account, even with 
difficulties, has a clear explanatory advantage over the alternate accounts. I will start my paper by 
explaining the causal theory, and will then go to these questions. !
!
!
4.2! Memory Causation!
!
During most of the first half of the 20th century, many philosophers held a view that our concept of 
memory did not require a reference to the cause of that which is remembered, much less to a 
causal connection between the past experience and the present recollection. This was partly 
because of the views that denied causality propounded by Russell (1921) and Wittgenstein (1953). 
The prominent view on memory in this period was that causal connection is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for an account of remembering.  This was the view held by Ryle (1949), in his analysis of 
memory, and Malcolm (1963). Munsat (1966) and Zemach (1968) advocated this view. In his work, 
Knowledge and Certainty, Malcolm said that “our use of the language of memory carries no 
implication” [237:1963] about the causes of our remembering or about the causal mechanisms. !
!
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One of the earliest proponents of a causal view was BS Benjamin. In his paper Remembering, 
published in 1956, Benjamin writes, “…it would be true to say that the everyday view of 
remembering is simply that it is the final stage of a causal process and that the memory is some 
sort of causal device or mechanism” [323:1956]. Similar views are held by W.Von Leyden when he 
says, “it is part of the meaning of memory that, when it is correct, it is causally dependant upon a 
previous perception” [31:1961]. After Martin and Deutscher published their seminal paper on the 
causal theory of memory in 1966, most philosophers have come to accept a view that the 
connection between past and present representation of an event involves a causal process. This 
includes Alvin Goldman (1967), Sydney Shoemaker (1970), Andrew Naylor (1971) and G.E.M. 
Anscombe (1981). The notion of causal connection is not only popular among philosophers, but 
also among empirical psychologists. (“Encoding and Retrieval of Information,” 2000: Brown, Scott 
C.; Craik, Fergus I. M., 1998: Sutton, John.)!
!
!
4.3! Martin & Deutscher on Remembering:!
!
Martin and Deutscher’s paper brought the causal condition to the forefront of the philosophical and 
psychological discussion on memory. In their paper, Martin and Deutscher argued against the 
claim that a causal process is not required for the concept of memory. Their argument is based on 
cases where the subject had a particular experience at a certain time, t1. The subject then forgets 
this experience during an arbitrary interval of time, t1.5. However, at a later time, t2, the subject has 
a certain something, a certain experience, “for which the only reasonable explanation” is that they 
experienced something at t1 [176:1966]. Martin and Deutscher note that the subject’s behaviour at 
t2 as a result of his experience at t1, can be explained only by invoking a causal claim. They 
proceed to say that “if a person’s account of what he saw is not due even in part to his seeing it, it 
cannot be said that he remembers what he saw” [175-176: 1966]. As the cases discussed fall 
under our everyday concept of remembering, the analysis concludes that the recollection of an 
experience must be due to him having experienced that in the past.!
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!
The argument that Martin and Deutscher reject, the view that memory does not involve a causal 
process, was initially championed by Gilbert Ryle in his work The Concept of Mind. According to 
Ryle, “remembering something means having learned something and not forgotten it” [248:2009]. 
Prima facie, this description will suit propositional memory better, even though Ryle does not 
present this as an explicit definition of propositional memory or any other type of memory. The 
description assures that the proposition remembered is not a relearned one. Ryle’s view finds its 
clearest expression in Holland (1954). Holland’s analysis is not limited to propositional memory. He 
argues that three conditions are adequate for remembering something. First, what recounted did, 
in fact, happen. Second, the subject is not being currently informed about what happened. Third, 
the subject observed what he now recounts. !
!
Though this account assures that the event or proposition remembered is not a relearned one, 
these conditions are too liberal, as this will include the cases where the remembered event was 
told to the subject at a later time. Imagine the case where the subject recounts an event from his 
childhood but can do so only because his mother told him. All the three conditions are satisfied in 
this case, but we cannot say that the subject is remembering the event. As these conditions are not 
sufficient for remembering, Martin and Deutscher reject this view. With Ryle’s view, there are other 
difficulties too which are not mentioned by Martin and Deutscher. Firstly, this account will not 
adequately explain the cases where a fact is learned, forgotten in between and remembered later. 
That is, Ryle’s description of memory is incapable of explaining a temporal gap, a gap where the 
subject cannot remember the proposition he learned. Secondly, there is a vicious circularity in this 
account of memory as the notion of remembering is defined by the way of appeal to notion of not 
forgetting. !
!
Martin and Deutscher present three cases to support their argument. First is the case of a painter 
who paints the detailed picture of a farmyard, which he takes to be an imaginary scene. The 
onlookers however note that the painting is an accurate representation of a scene that the painter 
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had seen during his childhood. Martin and Deutscher say that the painter in fact remembers the 
scene from his childhood, for “What other explanation could there be for his painting being so like 
what he has seen?” [168:1966]. In this case the painter is representing now what he had observed 
in the past. The only explanation that one can give for the similarity of the painting to the scene that 
the painter saw in his childhood is that he was remembering the scene, that his past experience 
was operative. The recollective experience that the painter has becomes a case of remembering, 
as it is causally connected with the painter’s previous experience. This case, according to Martin 
and Deutscher, shows that causation is a sufficient condition for a recollective experience to be a 
case of remembering.!
!
The second case that Martin and Deutscher presents is the case of Kent, who was in a car 
accident and sees the details of it. Later, Kent is involved in another accident because of which he 
forgets a certain section of his own history, including the first accident. Some time later, a hypnotist 
makes Kent believe that he had been in an accident, and the details the hypnotist provides about 
the accident give him all the details of the accident, which out of sheer coincidence matches with 
the first accident he had met with. Even if Kent can later describe the first accident in detail, we will 
not say that he remembers. Kent represents what he had observed in the past. But his past 
experience, the experience he had when he met with the accident, is not operative in producing his 
later claim. The current experience is not caused by the past experience and thus, Kent’s current 
experience is not a case of remembering. The case shows that causation is a necessary condition 
for a recollective experience to be a case of remembering.!
!
The third case is where someone wonders whether he really remembers a certain incident from his 
childhood or not. Even if the incident had happened, he might not be remembering it. Whether his 
parents told him that or whether he underwent similar experiences, watched similar incidents at 
many other times are all relevant in deciding if he really remembers the event. “These facts are the 
same as those which are used to decide whether or not he would have given the story if he had not 
 65
witnessed the event in his childhood. To decide that he would not have done so is to decide that 
his past witnessing is causally necessary for his present account” [176:1966].!
!
Martin and Deutscher [166:1966] summarise their version of Causal Theory of Memory as follows:!
!
If someone remembers something, whether it be “public,” such as a car accident, or “private,” such 
as an itch, then the following criteria must be fulfilled:!
!
1. Within certain limits of accuracy he represents that past thing.!
2. If the thing was “public”, then he observed what he now represents. If the thing was “private”, 
then it was his.!
3. His past experience of the thing was operative in producing a state or successive states in him, 
finally operative in producing his representation.!
!
One of the assumptions made here is that belief is not a necessary component of memory. In the 
case of Kent, he believes that his recollective experience is a case of memory, but we saw that it 
was not a case of genuine remembering. In the other two cases, the subject remembers, but does 
not believe. This brings up an important question. Is belief necessary for remembering? Can one 
remember something that one does not believe? There is an incoherence in the statement “I 
remember but I do not believe.” Martin and Deutscher attempt to explain this incoherence without 
assuming that to remember is at least to believe. (The details of this argument and how it fails is 
examined in the chapter Memory and Knowledge.) This incoherence can, however, be explained in 
a different way. Sven Bernecker develops such an argument. According to Bernecker, when I claim 
to remember that p, I am convinced that p is the case and hence believe that p. Yet, the second 
part of the statement denies that I believe that p. “‘I remember that p; but I don’t believe that p’ is 
incoherent not because one cannot remember that p without believing that p but because one 
cannot claim to remember that p while claiming to not believe that p” [146:1966]. As the conditions 
for claiming to remember are distinct from the conditions for remembering, it does not follow that 
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remembering that p implies believing that p because claiming to remember that p implies claiming 
to believe that p. But even if this is explained, and even if it can be argued that memory is possible 
without belief, there are other problems with Martin and Deutscher’s account. !
!
Firstly, the structure of the argument can be said to be flawed. The examples that Martin and 
Deutscher suggest fall in the everyday notion of remembering. “If a person’s account of what he 
saw is not due even in part to his seeing it, it cannot be said that he remembers what he 
saw“ [174:1966]. From this, they conclude that the subject’s remembering must be caused by his 
past experience. That is, the premise implies its own counter-positive. The premise suggests that if 
S’s cognitive experience amounts to remembering, then it is caused by E1. But then, this is exactly 
what the argument is trying to prove. Secondly, the causal condition as formulated above will not 
take care of deviant causal connections. !
!
Consider Kent’s case again. Suppose Kent had described the event he observed in detail to the 
hypnotist, before he met with the accident. Suppose that, it is this event that is hypnotically 
suggested to Kent and the event that Kent later ‘remembers.’ In this case, Kent’s later recount of 
the event is still causally connected to his past observation. Still, we cannot say that he 
remembers.  Martin and Deutscher are aware of this problem. They try to overcome the problem 
by invoking the notion of memory trace, a permanent structural modification of synapses in the 
brain. A further clause is added to their third criterion. !
!
Clause 1: The state or set of states produced by the past experience must constitute a structural 
analogue of the thing remembered, to the extent to which the subject can accurately represent the 
thing.!
!
However the mere existence of a trace does not warrant that the subject’s recollective experience 
has it’s origin in, or is related to, trace. Psychologists and neurologists suggest that even with the 
traces preserved intact, the subject sometimes might be unable to retrieve his past experiences. 
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[176:2009, Squire & Kandel: Memory: From Mind to Molecules, Also see 54-155:1996, Scahcater: 
Searching For Memory]!
!
Thirdly, Martin and Deutscher’s argument is from counterfactuals. It suggests that if S had not 
experienced E1 in the past, S will not remember E1 now. The problem with an argument from 
counterfactuals is that, a counterfactual statement is not equivalent to a causal statement. In his 
paper, Causes and Counterfactuals, Jaegwon Kim writes: “…the sort of dependency expressed by 
counterfactuals is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency and that causal 
dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships that can be 
expressed by counterfactuals” [570:1973]. A statement like “If George had not been born in 1950, 
he would not have celebrated his 63rd birthday in 2013” is a counterfactual statement. But from this 
statement we cannot conclude that George celebrating his 63rd birthday was caused by his being 
born in 1950. Bernecker says that “even if one’s present retelling of a past event is counterfactually 
dependant on one’s previous having witnessed that event, this doesn’t have to mean that the 
witnessing is the cause of the retelling” [21:2008:21].!
!
!
4.4! Personal Identity and Memory Causation!
!
Sydney Shoemaker presents another argument for causality in memory in his paper, Persons and 
Their Pasts. Shoemaker’s argument is from personal identity and he rests his argument on a 
hypothetical case:!
!
“Let us suppose that the brain from the body of one man, Brown, is transplanted into the body of 
another man, Robinson, and that the resulting creature – I call him “Brownson” – survives and 
upon regaining consciousness begins making memory claims corresponding to the past history of 
Brown rather than that of Robinson… I think that most people would want to say that Brownson is 
(is the same person as) Brown” [282:1970].!
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The claim here is that, analysing the personal identity by a non-causal notion of retention of past 
thoughts is circular. A non-causal notion of retention of memories will presuppose personal identity. 
We can say that Brownson is Brown, as Brownson retains Brown’s memories. But this 
“presupposes the identity of Brownson and Brown, and cannot without circularity be offered as 
evidence for it” [282:1970]. As a non-causal notion cannot be applied without circularity, we will 
have to resort to a causal notion of memory to explain Brownson’s identity. !
!
An objection that can be raised against this analysis is that personal identity cannot be defined in 
terms of memory connectedness. This objection was initially raised against John Locke by Bishop 
Butler. The argument is that, one must already have a criterion of personal identity in order to 
define memory. Real memories are apparent memories, in which the person remembering is the 
person who actually had the experience. (Butler: 2006, See also Schechtman: 1990) Since the fact 
of identity is prior to the distinction between real and apparent memory, personal identity cannot be 
defined in terms of memory connectedness.!
!
Shoemaker develops an idea of quasi-remembering to overcome this objection. Quasi-
remembering is the kind of knowledge of past events “such that someone’s having this sort of 
knowledge of an event, does involve there being a correspondence between his present cognitive 
state and a past cognitive and sensory state that was of the event, but such that this 
correspondence, although otherwise just like that which exists in memory, does not necessarily 
involve that past state’s having been a state of the very same person who subsequently has the 
knowledge” [271:1970]. In effect, the notion of quasi remembering, unlike remembering, does not 
imply personal identity. It is this notion that Shoemaker uses to define personal identity. Using this 
notion, Shoemaker argues that while the non-causal theory of memory presupposes personal 
identity, a causal theory of memory (or quasi memory) does not presuppose personal identity.!
!
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There are two problems with this account. First, the claim that a non-causal theory of memory 
should be rejected because it presupposes personal identity is problematic. Just like the idea of 
quasi-memory which does not presuppose personal identity, one can define non-causal retention 
which does not entail personal identity. Delmas Lewis, in his paper Dualism and the Causal Theory 
of Memory, develops such an idea and calls it quasi-retention [29:1983]. S quasi-retains a past 
experience, iff: a) there is a correspondence between his present cognitive state in which he 
represents the experience, and the past state in which the said experience was acquired and b) 
the past state need not have been a state of S. (See also Ginet, 170:1975)!
!
Second, Shoemaker’s analysis is based on counterfactuals too. Brownson cannot make memory 
claims pertaining to Brown’s past history, without such statements being directly connected with 
Brown’s past actions and experiences. Shoemaker writes he can see no reason for doubting that 
such counterfactuals assert causal connections. But as we noted in the above section, 
counterfactuals are not equivalent to causality. !
!
!
4.5! Retention Theory: Malcolm on Connection with the Past 
!
Arguments for a causal connection with the past that are examined above come with certain 
difficulties. There are alternate accounts which attempt to explain the connection with past without 
assuming a causal connection. After Norman Malcolm’s influential Three Lectures on Memory 
(1963), many philosophers held a view that memory is retention of knowledge, and that it can be 
explained without invoking a causal connection condition. E.M. Zemach (1968), Alan Holland 
(1974), Andrew Naylor (1971) and David Annis (1980) are some of the philosophers who held 
views that did not assign a role to causation in explaining memory.!
!
Rejecting a causal process in memory, Malcolm holds that memory is retention of knowledge. 
There are three arguments Malcolm raises against causation. Firstly, in experiential memory, 
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remembering is logically connected with the past. Malcolm raises this logical dependency as an 
objection. Malcolm says, “One might object to the idea that the supposed effect is causally 
dependant on the supposed cause, for the reason that the “effect” is logically dependant on the 
cause” [231:1963]. The relation between cause and effect cannot be that of logical dependency. If 
all one knew was the effect, one cannot infer the cause. But this is not so in remembering. When I 
say that I remember having seen Queen Mary in drydock, it logically implies that I have seen 
Queen Mary in drydock. It is logically impossible that one remembers having seen something 
unless one saw it. From the supposed effect (remembering), we can infer the supposed cause 
(experience in the past). Secondly,  Malcolm says that the nomological character of causation is 
absent in memory. Malcolm’s objection is inspired by Hume. Hume defines cause to be “an object, 
followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to 
the second” [76:1975]. Memory is not such a law-governed process, as we cannot commit 
ourselves to the general proposition that “In like circumstances, whenever a person has previously 
known that p then he knows that p.” Thirdly, our everyday notion of remembering carries no 
implication of an unbroken causal connection. Malcolm agrees with Von Leyden in his view that the 
process of retention is itself unobservable. One of the sceptical observations Malcolm makes is 
that a causal process or a continuous connection is never there, and occurrences of the so called 
“recollections” are never manifestations of a process of remembering. Rejecting a causal process 
in memory based on the above three arguments, Malcolm defines memory thus: “A person, B, 
remembers that p from a time, t, if and only if B knows that p, and B knew that p at t, and if B had 
not known at t that p he would not now know that p.”  
!
As with the causal theory of memory, Malcolm’s definition excludes relearning and assures that the 
representation one has in remembering is a retained representation of the past. But this definition 
is problematic. Malcolm’s definition presupposes an epistemic view of memory, where to remember 
something is to know it. Memory is retention of knowledge. Given that knowledge implies true 
belief and justification, to remember that p: a) one must belief that p, b) p should be true and c) one 
should be justified in believing that p. An objection that can be raised here is that the epistemic 
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theory of memory is flawed and that belief is not a necessary component of memory. One can 
remember that p, without believing that p. Consider a person who gets a thought that, as a child he 
met with an accident.  He does not believe that he had such an accident. However, unknown to 10
him, he had in fact met with an accident as a child. The thought that comes to his mind is then an 
instance of factual memory. He does not believe, and so he does not know, yet he remembers.  11
Malcolm’s definition is insufficient because one can remember that p without knowing that p. (This 
is examined in detail in the next chapter.) 
!
Further, Malcolm’s arguments against the causal theory of memory are problematic. Malcolm’s first 
objection was based on the logical dependency of the supposed effect over the supposed cause. It 
is logically impossible that S can remember having seen X unless S had in fact seen X in the past. 
The problem with this objection is that logical implication essentially depends on the content of 
sentences. Malcolm’s objection is a difficulty that arises from the notion of sentential description of 
an event. We usually bring an event under the purview of logic by talking about its description. If 
this description includes the causally relevant properties of the event, the logical dependency that 
Malcolm mentions is inescapable. “The ground is wet due to the rain yesterday”, logically implies 
that it rained yesterday. However, this does not mean that there is no causal relationship between 
yesterday’s rain and the ground getting wet. Yesterday’s rain is the cause of ground being wet 
today. Jaegwon Kim examines the implication of description operators in the sentential description 
of an event in detail, in his paper Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event. (See 
also Bernecker [19:2008]) Kim writes, “Once the description operator is available, we can pack as 
much "content" as we like into any singular sentence, and this can likely be done without changing 
the identity of the event described. Obviously, this is bound to cause trouble for any account of 
causation or nomic subsumption based on the relation of logical implication”  [219:1973]. 
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 A similar case is presented by Malcolm [213:1963]. It is a case of experiential memory. Malcolm 10
says that we cannot conclusively say whether the person experientially remembers or not, if he 
does not believe what appears in his mind.
 Sven Bernecker, in his paper, Remembering without Knowing presents a detailed argument 11
against the epistemic theory of memory, and the notion that remembering implies believing. 
[146-151:2007]
!
Malcolm’s second objection is regarding the nomological character of causation.  This is also 12
flawed. The view that it is not possible to have laws of memory is mistaken. After the German 
psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus brought the study of memory into laboratory in 1880s, 
psychologists and neurologists have framed many “law-like regularities” in memory. Karl Lashley, 
Wilder Penfield and Edward Thorndike came up with such laws in learning and memory [Squire 
and Kandel: 2009]. Martin and Deutscher, in their paper, have examined Malcolm’s third objection, 
that our concept of memory carries no implication of an unbroken causal connection. Dialling a 
number will make the phone ring on the other end. It would be absurd to suggest that one should 
know the process involved. Likewise the unbroken causal connection need not be known while we 
remember. !
!
!
4.6! Retention Gap and Causal Connection: Squires on Memory!
!
In his paper Memory Unchained, Roger Squires criticises the notion of a causal process in 
memory. Squires’s views are in response to Martin and Deutscher’s version of causal theory. 
Rejecting a “forced reference to causal connection” in memory, Squires says that all three cases 
presented by Martin and Deutscher can be explained without invoking causation. According to 
Squires, a person’s present representation of an event is connected to his past witnessing of that 
event not via a causal connection, but via a certain ability that he acquired and retained in virtue of 
having that experience in the past. He exercises this ability while remembering the past event. 
Memory is essentially the retention of knowledge.!
!
“We can sometime explain the fact that someone who had a car last year has a car now by saying 
that he must have had it all along. But this is not a causal explanation. Similarly, when we explain 
that someone must be remembering we are, in general, either pointing out that what he did was a 
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 Same objection is raised by Carl Ginet [167:1975]12
display of knowledge (rather than an accident, say) or we are saying that he has had the 
knowledge all along” [191: 1969].!
!
Squires says that causal connection is a “superfluous piece of philosophical engineering” and that 
philosophers are forced to invoke a causal connection to explain the retention gap; instances of 
temporal forgetting. Causality is invoked by philosophers, as there is an ambiguity in the notion of 
retained ability while explaining temporal forgetting. He illustrates his point by an example. 
Suppose, a teddy bear kept in the attic has the ability to squeak when pressed. In winter, because 
of the dampness in the attic, it does not squeak. In summer we try again and find that it squeaks. 
One will say that the teddy bear has retained its squeak, though this ability was discontinuous. 
Squires notes that the discontinuity that one might see in this case is the result of an ambiguity 
from the use of the phrases “in winter” and “in summer”. The ability to squeak in winter is not the 
same as ability to squeak in summer. The toy has retained its ability, as even in winter, it had the 
ability to squeak in summer. The ability that it lost (ability to squeak in winter) is not the ability it 
retained (ability to squeak in summer.) Applying this idea to memory, Squires claims that the ability 
we lose when we forget something is not the ability we retain. “[…] we need to specify exactly what 
has been forgotten. When we forget something, and then remember it, the capacity we lose is not 
the capacity we keep”  [186: 1969]. The idea here is that, there is a difference between forgetting 
something forever, and forgetting something temporarily. When we forget an experience forever, 
we lose the capacity to represent that experience in any circumstance. When we forget an 
experience temporarily, only to remember it later, we retain the capacity to represent that 
experience in particular circumstances. !
!
Squires applies this argument to the cases suggested by Martin and Deutscher. The case where 
an artist paints a farmyard,, which he takes to be imaginary, is a case of remembering, because 
the painter, unknown to him, acquired and retained a capacity from his childhood to represent this 
farmyard. The second case is that of a person who, after hypnotic suggestion, recounts the details 
of an accident which he witnessed. Here, the subject is not remembering because there is no 
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continuous possession of knowledge. That is, the possession of knowledge is not dated from the 
event itself. The ability that he exercises is not dated from the car crash, but from the hypnotic 
suggestion. The third case, the case where a person cannot decide whether he is remembering an 
incident from his childhood or has been told about it, can be accommodated too, for we can decide 
whether he is remembering the incident or not by considering whether his ability to recount the 
event dates from the time he witnessed it.!
!
Apart from the difficulties that come with an epistemic view of memory, there are three further 
problems with Squires’s account of memory. Firstly, his theory will not account for the cases where 
one has temporarily forgotten something and remembers that something only after a complete 
prompt. Don Locke points out this difficulty with Squires’s account, in his essay on memory. “[…] if 
someone reminds me of some fact I had completely forgotten, and would not have remembered if 
he had not reminded me, it does not seem correct to say that I possessed that knowledge 
continuously” [63:1971]. Secondly, Squires’s view that, in temporary forgetting we lose the capacity 
to retain information about a past experience in only particular circumstances is hardly informative. 
All our abilities can be exercised only in particular circumstances. Since none of our abilities are 
such that we have them in any circumstance, we never forget anything permanently [Bernecker 
25:2008]. All cases of forgetting are cases of temporal forgetting. Empirical psychologists who 
subscribe to the Interference Theory of memory hold that memory never fades and, once encoded, 
is stored in brain forever. According to the interference theory, it is the learning of something else 
that causes forgetting - the original memory is difficult to access because of the learning of other 
memories that compete with each other during retrieval. [Schacter: 1996, Tomlinson et al. 2009: 
589, Bjork, 2011: 2]. What is experienced is always there, and we cannot permanently forget 
anything. Squire’s differentiation of temporary forgetting and permanent forgetting is thus wrong as, 
in principle, any memory can be retrieved given the right cue, and all instances of forgetting are 
temporary forgetting. Thirdly, Squires says that memory is retention of knowledge but says nothing 
about the process involved in this retention. This problem is relevant for all accounts of retention 
theories, including Malcolm’s account. In the case of a causal theory, this retention process is 
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explained by invoking the notion of memory traces. If we leave the retention process unexplained, 
it will make memory something like fortune telling, a magical faculty. !
!
If memory is to be defined as retained knowledge or ability, one will have explain the process of 
retention. None of the retention theorists have come up with a theory which explains this process 
satisfactorily. Here, a causal theory has a clear explanatory advantage. Casual theorist can explain 
how one retains a past experience. !
!
Consider the second case presented by Martin and Deutscher, the case of Kent who meets with an 
accident and forgets about it after a second accident. Now, suppose that soon after his first 
accident, Kent describes his experience in detail to his cousin. Later, after the second accident, 
under hypnotic suggestion, Kent’s cousin gives Kent a complete description of the first accident. 
Suppose that, Kent is able to describe the first accident in detail after the hypnotic suggestion. In 
this case, Kent’s recount of the accident is causally connected with his experience. But it would still 
not be right to say that Kent remembers. The causal chain that connects his present recollection 
with his past experience is deviant. To exclude such causal connections, and to explain the 
process of memory retention, causal theorists subscribe to the idea of engrams or memory traces. 
There is growing empirical evidence of the existence of memory traces. Philosophers, 
psychologists and neuroscientists alike have come to accept the notion of memory traces, and this 
notion has now become an indispensable part of any important theory of memory.!
!
!
4.7! Memory Traces!
!
What sort of changes occur in us, in our brain, while encoding an experience? According to trace 
theory, there occurs a structural modification at synapses, the area where the axion of one neuron 
connects with the dentrite of another neuron, that affect the ease with which neurons in a neural 
network can activate each other. This encoding does not happen in a specific location. That is, 
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there is no separate memory center in the brain where memories are stored. Squire and Kandel 
write that Information is stored as memory in the same distributed assembly of brain structures that 
are engaged in initially perceiving and processing what is to be remembered. The connectionist 
approach in trace theory has it that remembering is realised by patterns of activation in a network 
of model neurons and the memorial process consists of the spreading activation of such patterns. 
Engrams or memory traces are “the sum total of changes in brain that first encoded an experience 
and that then constitute the record of an experience.” (Squire and Kandel; [78:2009])!
!
This view explains some interesting facts about memory. Firstly, it explains why a brain damage 
will not cause a sudden loss of one’s history. It has been observed by neurologists that after brain 
damage, the memory system slowly becomes worse. This phenomenon is called ‘graceful 
degradation.’ The view that a number of brain regions are involved in representing a single event, 
helps us understand this gradual worsening of memory. Secondly, the theory explains 
reconstructive process in memory. As there is no single memory centre, we do not go to a discrete 
location to find something. While remembering an event, only some fragment of the engram may 
be activated. We engage in a reconstructive process and comes with an approximation of the past. 
As connectionist computers we don't need to perceive every letter in a string of words to be able to 
read it. Anderson writes, “To xlIxstxatx, I cxn rxplxce xvexy txirx lextex of x sextexce xitx an x, anx 
yox stxll xan xanxge xo rxad xt— wixh sxme xificxltx” [62:1995]. 
!
!
4.8! Traces in Philosophy of Memory!
!
The earliest reference to the idea of a trace can be seen in Aristotle’s De Memoria, where he says 
“[in remembering] the change that occurs [in soul] marks in a sort of imprint, as it were, of the 
sense image, as people do who seal things with signet rings.” (De Memoria: 450a-25) Locke too 
uses such metaphors, where he says that we forget our experiences because the pictures laid in 
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our minds are laid in fading colours and if that inscription moulders away, all that remains is brass 
and marble. [151-152: 1979]!
!
The contemporary discussions on memory give vital importance to the idea of memory traces. 
Martin and Deutscher, in their paper, give a further clause to their third condition for remembering: 
“The state or set of states produced by the past experience must constitute a structural analogue 
of the thing remembered, to the extent to which he can accurately represent the thing” [191: 1966]. 
Philosophers who hold a representative realist view hold that the very idea of memory storage calls 
for the stipulation of memory traces. Some of the Direct realists, however, are hostile towards the 
idea of memory traces, as direct realist theory, in a strict sense cannot, in principle, accommodate 
the notion of a representation. Woozley writes that a representation will invoke dualism, as “a 
distinction needs to be made between the appearance given [tothe subject] and whatever object it 
is to which the appearance belongs” [22:1949]. But this worry is misplaced. Even though traces are 
representations, the subject is not aware of the representations themselves, nor does he interpret 
the past consciously from these representations. If we see traces in this sense, the immediate 
awareness is still that of the past and not that of a representation. Sutton writes, “when 
representations are thought ocas brain states, it is clear that they are not immediate objects of 
experience which a subject then consciously puts to use” [282:1998].!
!
Though most of the philosophers think that an explanation of remembering will include reference to 
a trace acquired in the past, there are a few important arguments that are raised against the notion 
of a trace. Malcolm, for example, rejects the notion of a trace and says, “We can agree with Martin 
and Deutscher that the language of memory does, in a sense, require a “causal interpretation”, but 
not agree that memory as a causal concept entails the concept of causal process. Eliminate the 
assumption of a causal process, and the causal argument for a memory trace collapses. 
[185:1977]. ” Essentially, Malcolm says that one can accept that the subject’s experience of a 
particular event causes or, at least, is causally relevant to the subject’s recollection of the same 
event without having to accept the notion of a memory trace. According to Malcolm, one need not 
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be concerned about the temporal distance, and the past experience can be causally relevant over 
a temporal distance.!
!
Malcolm seems to have been inspired by a version of causation in memory developed by Bertrand 
Russell. In his Analysis of Mind (1921), Russell proposes an account of memory causation which 
can manage without accepting the idea of a memory trace. He calls this mnemic phenomena. 
Russell says, the past can act upon the present experience, without directly modifying the brain 
structure. Russell writes, “This characteristic is embodied in the saying "a burnt child fears the fire." 
The burn may have left no visible traces, yet it modifies the reaction of the child in the presence of 
fire. It is customary to assume that, in such cases, the past operates by modifying the structure of 
the brain, not directly” [77:2007].!
!
Further, Russell says, “In attempting to state the proximate cause of the present event, some past 
event or events must be included, unless we take refuge in hypothetical modifications of brain 
structure. For example: you smell peat-smoke, and you recall some occasion when you smelt it 
before. The cause of your recollection, so far as hitherto observable phenomena are concerned, 
consists both of the peat smoke (present stimulus) and of the former occasion (past experience). 
The same stimulus will not produce the same recollection in another man who did not share your 
former experience, although the former experience left no observable traces in the structure of the 
brain. According to the maxim “same cause, same effect,” we cannot therefore regard the peat-
smoke alone as the cause of your recollection, since it does not have the same effect in other 
cases. The cause of your recollection must be both the peat-smoke and the past occurrence. 
Accordingly your recollection is an instance of what we are calling “mnemic 
phenomena” [78-79:2007].!
!
Russell’s theory is primarily motivated by his hesitance to accept contiguous causation. According 
to Hume, whatever objects considered as causes or effects are contiguous, and nothing can 
operate in a time or place, which is ever so little removed from those of its existence. There are 
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cases which appear to be not distant in space and time. For example, setting an alarm clock now 
will make it ring after a while, or pressing a button on the remote-control will switch off the 
television. Cases such as these, where the cause and effect seem temporally or spatially distant, 
are linked by a chain of causes, which are contiguous among themselves. Here there is remote 
and proximate cause: remote cause is connected with the effect through a chain of causes, and 
the last link in this chain of causes is the proximate cause. Spatial and temporal contiguity is thus, 
an essential condition for causation. In the absence of such contiguity, anything can intervene and 
prevent the effect from occurring, even if the cause had occurred.!
!
Russell, who in other cases is inclined to follow Hume, differs on the idea of contiguous causation 
with him. According to Russell, a cause cannot be temporally contiguous with effect. The real effect 
can take place only after the last link of the causal chain - the proximate cause-event - has taken 
place. Even if there is a slight interval between the proximate cause and the event, something can 
intervene which can prevent the event from occurring. This would mean that there cannot be even 
a slight interval of time between the cause and effect. That is, cause and effect have to be 
simultaneous. Illustrating this paradox, Russell rejects contiguous causation.!
!
Trace theory, on the other hand, is designed to account for contiguous causation. The theory holds 
that the past event is the remote cause and the traces are proximate cause. Having rejected the 
notion of contiguous causation, Russell rejects trace theory and argues for mnemic causation, 
where the past experience is directly causally relevant over a temporal distance. !
!
Here again, trace theory has a clear explanatory advantage over mnemic causation. Russell does 
not explain where and how information is stored, in the mnemic phenomenon. Previously, the 
difficulties with Squires’s account of memory was discussed. Squires held that by witnessing an 
event, we acquire a certain capacity, a certain disposition, and that it is this capacity we are 
exercising while we remember a past event. Such a theory cannot explain how and where the 
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information is retained for us to exercise the said ability. This difficulty is relevant in Russell’s 
mnemic causation too.!
!
The second argument that Russell raises against trace theory is the limited evidence for memory 
traces. Russell says that traces are “in fact hypothetical, invoked for theoretical uses, and not an 
outcome of direct observation.” Russell’s sentiments are shared by Zemach (1983: 32, 33) when 
he says that causal theory of memory “cannot dictate to science what to discover in the human 
brain. It may be the case that, despite current popular notions, no such analogue will be 
discovered.” This worry is misplaced.  Though exact empirical proof is yet to come through, there is 
a growing body of evidence for memory traces and neurologists and psychologists alike have 
come to accept the existence of traces. (Squire and Kandel: 2009, Schacter: 1996).!
!
4.9! Conclusion!
!
An appropriate causal connection is needed between one’s past and present cognitive states, for 
that state to be a case of remembering. Memory traces are indispensable for a decent theory of 
memory. Such a theory, which assigns a central role to traces, is not dictating to science what to 
discover in the human brain. A theory which fails to consider the existence of trace considers 
memory as a magical faculty like clairvoyance.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 5!
!
KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY!
!
!
5.1! Introduction!
!
Much of the knowledge that we have comes from memory. This motivates some philosophers to 
say that memory is a source of knowledge. They consider memory as a source of knowledge 
similar to perception and testimony. Others say that memory is a passive device, and memory 
cannot provide us with new knowledge. Their argument is that memory cannot provide us with 
anything new and that it can only inform us about previously acquired knowledge. The question 
here is about the relationship between memory and knowledge. This debate is still alive among 
contemporary philosophers. The widely advocated view that most philosophers have come to 
accept is that remembering entails knowledge. In his detailed analysis of memory, Norman 
Malcolm says, “A person B, remembers that p if and only if B knows that p because he knew that 
p.” [223:1963]. Similarly, Robert Audi states, “if you remember that we met, you know that we 
did” [67:1998]. Roger Squires and Michael Dummett viewed memory as retention of knowledge. 
Dummett says that “[memory is] the maintenance of knowledge acquired by whatever 
means” [421:1996]. Squires expresses similar views too [185:1969]. The received view in 
philosophy of memory is that, if one learns that p at t1, and remembers that p at a later time t2, one 
knows that p at t2. !
!
I will be discussing the relationship between memory and knowledge in this chapter. The two 
questions that I am going to examine in this chapter are: 1. How to distinguish between those 
memories that can be regarded as knowledge and those that can be regarded only as beliefs? 2. 
Does propositional memory entail knowledge? My conclusions are that: 1. There is an intrinsic 
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epistemic authority for memory, and one is entitled to hold memory at face value till one is 
presented with countervailing evidence. 2. Propositional memory does not entail knowledge, as 
belief and justification are not necessary conditions for remembering that p.!
!
!
5.2! Reliability of Memory!
!
While one remembers, it is in the character of one’s present memory-experience that one finds the !
evidence of the past event. In this sense, memory is a source of knowledge. But how can one be 
confident that the information provided by memory is reliable? Suppose that I remember that the 
value of pi is 3.14. How do I know that this value, given by memory, is correct? We take such 
information that comes from memory at face value and we count this as reliable, because such 
information provided to us by memory, in the past, has been mostly true. This method is obviously 
problematic because it is by memory we are aware, that in the past memory provided us with 
correct information. Here the observations, which are used to check the accuracy of memory, are 
themselves based on memory. Alternatively, we can verify the value of pi by checking an 
elementary mathematics textbook. But still the problem remains. We will have to rely on memory, 
and it is by memory that we can be confident that the information provided in the textbook is 
reliable. Whatever be the method we employ to assure ourselves of the correctness of the 
information given by memory, at some point or other, we will have to rely on memory. At some point 
or other, it will involve the fact that we remember that something was the case. The problem with 
such an argument is that, it tries to defend the reliability of memory by relying on premises that are 
themselves based on memory. It is an epistemically circular argument. !
!
Most philosophers who have analysed memory are aware of this problem and have proposed 
various solutions. GF Stout says that a memory-belief is self-evident and contains its own evidence 
[215-224:1931]. External evidence is unnecessary as such beliefs are self-evident. RF Harrod 
urges that we should treat the trustworthiness of memory as we would a scientific hypothesis 
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[57:1942]. If we examine what consequences will follow if the hypothesis be true, and examine 
whether the experience accords with these consequences, we can conclude that the experience 
does verify the hypothesis. But there are a lot of questions that come up with such arguments. The 
important question, how does one know what verifies a memory-belief without appeal to memory, 
is left unanswered. Similarly, according to EJ Furlong when we say that memory is not trustworthy, 
we are using memory to disprove memory [10:1951].!
!
It has been argued that this circularity cannot be avoided entirely. In his seminal paper, William 
Alston [1986] examines these circular arguments. He concludes that without using such 
epistemically circular arguments, one cannot justifiably believe or know that our sources of beliefs 
are reliable. However, this circularity, according to Alston, does not disqualify an argument. Taking 
sense perception as his point, he says, “epistemic circularity does not in and of itself disqualify the 
argument . But even granting this point, the argument will not do its job unless we are justified in 13
accepting its premises; and that is the case only if sense perception is in fact reliable. This is to 
offer a stone instead of bread. We can say the same of any belief-forming practice whatever, no 
matter how disreputable. We can just as well say of crystal ball gazing that if it is reliable, we can 
use a track-record argument to show that it is reliable. But when we ask whether one or another 
source of belief is reliable, we are interested in discriminating those that can be reasonably trusted 
from those that cannot. Hence merely showing that if a given source is reliable it can be shown by 
its record to be reliable, does nothing to indicate that the source belongs to the sheep rather that 
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 Here, argument is the track-record argument: !13!
1. At t1, S1 formed the perceptual belief that p1, and p1.!
2. At t2, S2 formed the perceptual belief that p2, and p2.!
…………!!
Therefore, sense experience is a reliable source of belief.!!
In this argument, the conclusion ‘sense experience is a reliable source of belief’, does not 
appear anywhere in the premises. Yet the argument is circular because in the premises, I 
am presupposing that my beliefs based on sense experience are generally true.!
with the goats” [17:1993]. The point is that, we cannot remove doubts about reliability of the source 
of knowledge, even if we are to assume reliabilism.!
!
There are two problems here. Firstly, in the case of those memories that we consider to be 
genuine, we take the output from our memory to be reliable and then we defend the reliability of 
memory by relying on premises that are themselves based on memory. Secondly, while we are 
presented with faint memories, those thoughts which we cannot distinguish from imagination, we 
are aware that memory has deceived us in the past and that the present memory-cognitions can 
be erroneous too. We reason that such thoughts could be cases of misremembering or false 
remembering. But even to reason this way, we will have to rely on memory. It is by memory we 
know that we have had episodes of misrememberings in the past. H.H.Price says, “… in order to 
assert that my memory has deceived me even once, I have to know a number of facts about the 
past. Unless some memory is knowledge, I have no ground whatever for asserting that some 
memory is only belief” [17:1936]. Similarly, David Owens states, “Any investigation into the 
reliability of memory will make use of beliefs about the past. […] So in any such enquiry, some 
memories must be taken at face value, at least to start with. An agnostic about memory could not 
even begin to determine which of his memories he should accept and which he should 
suspect” [314:1999].!
!
We cannot assume that all that we remember is knowledge, as we are aware that very often our 
memory deceives us. A number of cases, where the subject remembers but does not know, have 
been examined by various philosophers (Martin & Deutscher [1966: 167], Boghossian [13:1989], 
Bernecker [151:2007], Bernecker [73:2010]). But these cases and the arguments presented do not 
explain why certain cases of remembering are cases of knowing and why certain cases are not. 
Just on the basis of introspection, the subject cannot distinguish genuine memory from false 
memory (or in some cases imagination). To make this distinction, a subject needs information 
beyond what is available through introspection. But even such information is ultimately dependent 
on memory.  The question here is, how to make a distinction. How can we distinguish between 
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those memories that can be taken at face-value, i.e., memories that can be regarded as knowledge 
and those memories that can be regarded only as beliefs? !
!
In our everyday life, however, we usually trust our memory-cognitions. We usually consult our 
memory and take our memory-cognitions at face value. We think that if we remember that p, we 
know that p. This motivated some philosophers to hold a view that propositional memory entails 
knowledge. According to them, the aforementioned cases (Martin & Deutscher [167:1966], 
Boghossian [13:1989]) are not cases of remembering, as the subject does not know. If I remember 
that p, I know that p.!
!
The alternate view, the view that memory does not provide knowledge, is not a new one. In Plato’s 
Theaetetus, Theaetetus says that the view, that remembering is possible without knowing, would 
be “monstrous”. In the dialogue that follows, Socrates says that if someone has come to have 
knowledge of something at some time, and he still has, and preserves, a memory of that very 
thing, it is still possible that at the very same time he remembers it, he might fail to know it. The 
idea is that one must be directly acquainted with the object, to know that object. In the case of 
memory, such a direct acquaintance is impossible, and thus, it is impossible to know what is 
remembered. That is, memory, even when it is accurate, does not provide us with knowledge. 
[163d5]!
!
The view that Theaetetus holds, and the view that is prevalent among the contemporary 
discussions on memory, is the epistemic theory of memory. This is also the common sense view. 
Bernecker summarizes the epistemic theory of memory thus. “To remember that p is to know that 
p, where this knowledge was previously acquired and preserved. A source other than memory is 
responsible for the original acquisition of knowledge that p. Memory preserves rather than 
generates knowledge” [67:2010]. According to the epistemic theory of memory, S remembers that 
p at t2, if: !
!
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1. S knows at t2 that p.!
2. S knew at t1 that p. !
3. S’s knowing at t2 that p is suitably connected to S’s knowing at t1 that p.!
!
An epistemic theory would be the simplest way to explain the relationship between memory and 
knowledge. !
!
Since the three conditions, belief, justification and truth are individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient for the traditional concept of propositional knowledge, these three conditions have to be 
satisfied in propositional memory too. Among these conditions, the third condition, the truth-
condition, is unproblematic. One can know or remember only what is the case. If the case is not-p, 
then S cannot remember that p. He might think that he remembers, or might even claim 
knowledge, but he cannot actually remember. The other two conditions, the justification condition 
and belief condition are not so. These conditions need to be examined and if it can be shown that 
one can remember that p though one did not justifiably believed that p in the past, or that one can 
remember that p though one does not justifiably believe that p in the present, the epistemic theory 
fails.!
!
!
5.3! Accepting Memory-Judgements!
!
For asserting the falsity of memory judgements, or even for doubting the falsity, we have to 
assume at first the reliability of at least some of the memory judgements. Price says, “[to assume 
some memory as infallible] is a way of stating that some memory is knowledge in the strict sense, 
i.e., that it is a direct or immediate apprehension of past events or situations” [24:1936]. There are 
cases where one learns about the past by using one’s background knowledge. To bring out this 
point Daniel Dennett asks one to answer the questions, “Have you ever danced with a movie star?” 
or “Have you ever been introduced to a white-haired lady whose first name begins with the letter 
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V?” [147:1991]. Most of us would answer the first question in the negative and would draw a blank 
on the second question, even though we would not occurrently remember anything relevant to the 
proposition in both the cases. We treat these two cases differently, though in both cases we do not 
recall anything relevant to the proposition. Dennett suggests that this is because, we think that, had 
we danced with a movie star, we would now remember it. There is no reason to suppose the same 
with the second question. In the first case, we can unconsciously assess the likelihood that the 
failure of our memory to produce a recollection is a sign from which we can unconsciously "infer" 
the conclusion "I have never done that." Our memory provides inductive evidence for the answer to 
the first question. We accept this evidence and answer the question that ‘I have not danced with a 
movie star.’ Our default reaction to the memory judgement is acceptance. !
!
This view, the view that our epistemic position towards memory is not neutral, is defended by the 
claim that memory has an intrinsic, prima facie epistemic authority. Pollock says, “we must start 
with the stock of beliefs we already have and then amend those beliefs in light of 
themselves” [83:1986]. According to this theory, we are entitled to hold a memory belief unless we 
have some positive reason for thinking we should not hold it. There are various accounts of this 
theory, which differ as to what can defeat the prima facie authority of such beliefs. We need not 
concern ourselves with this difference at the moment. The important point is that when we 
remember that p, memory provides us with some form of evidence that p and we can accept the 
proposition based on this prima facie evidence, unless there is some countervailing evidence. 
Harman [1986], Plantinga [1993] and Dummett [1996] endorse this theory, though they differ on 
what can defeat the prima facie authority of belief.!
!
The problem here is that such a model would not fit propositional memory, though it would fit 
experiential memory. In the case of experiential memory, we have two components in an episode 
of recollection. We have a) the image, feelings and emotions associated with the image (qualia), 
and b) a belief about the past. The image gives evidence for the propositional belief associated 
with it. Same is the case with perception. There are two components in perception; the perceptual 
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experience and the belief associated with it. The perceptual experience gives evidence for the 
belief associated with the experience. In the case of propositional memory, we do not have such 
two components. The recollection that p, say remembering the value of pi, cannot be discerned 
into two elements. !14
!
Pollock tries to overcome this objection by suggesting that propositional memory does have 
another element to it. The recollection that p, adds something to the belief that p. In other words 
remembering that p is a state which is different from believing that p. Suppose a physicist comes 
up with a complex theory after years of hard work, and that the scientific community finally accepts 
his theory. After the theory is a well-entrenched part of physics, one day, the physicist thinks back 
over his work, and recalls an early experiment by his assistant, which contradicts his theory. 
Though he recalls it, he mistrusts his memory with complete justification as it conflicts with a huge 
body of subsequent evidence. The case illustrates that one can recall that p, without believing that 
p, and that the two states are distinct. !
!
David Owens objects to this distinction. Owen’s take is that propositional memory does not involve 
something like a sensory impression, something which occurs irrespective of our acceptance. 
Owens is right in his objection that propositional memory does not involve a different component. If 
I am asked to answer a questionnaire on Indian history, and if I am set to rely on memory, I will 
come up with the answers whether or not I recall the event at which I learned. I might recall that I 
had read the answers in a history book, and might recall the author’s name, but none of this is 
necessary for me to remember the answers. The details of the book and it’s author might at best 
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 Representative realism says that there is something that accompanies a memory-image, which 14
tells us that it is a memory-image. Russell says that there is a ‘sense of pastness’ that 
accompanies the image. [162:1921] This ‘sense of pastness’ can be seen as the second 
component, but again, this will be suitable only for experiential memory. While propositionally 
remembering something, it is not necessary that the subject should have an image. Even if there is 
an image, that image is not a constituent of memory, it simply serves as an aid. The better I 
remember, the less likely it is that I will have an image. Ayer says that “[propositional memory] 
consists in nothing more than giving a successful performance. […] To remember a fact is simply to 
be able to state it. The power is displayed in its exercise.” [137: 1990] 	  
serve as aide-memoire. These are not indispensable for me to remember the facts. Ayer says, “a 
historian who remembers, for example, what the state of parties was throughout the reign of 
Queen Victoria, a biologist who remembers Lamarck’s version of evolution, a mathematician who 
remembers Pythagoras’s proof of the existence of irrational numbers, a jurist who remembers 
Lamarck’s a point of corporation law, need none of them be recollecting any past event; nor need 
they be having any images. Their remembering just consists in their getting the answer right” [137: 
1990].!
!
Further, Pollock’s case is not strictly a case of propositional memory. The scientist is episodically 
remembering, and infers that the earlier experiment conflicts with a huge body of evidence. To 
remember the earlier experiment, and to conclude that it contradicts his theory, is different from 
propositional memory, which consists in a successful performance without recalling the past 
consciously. !
!
If memory is a different state from belief and if it consists in just having a successful performance, it 
would mean that memory cannot provide prima-facie justification for the proposition remembered.  !
!
Consider the case where I prove a long mathematical theorem. When I move step by step and 
reach step seven, I might not hold in mind the proof that I had for step three. I would still believe 
step seven of my theorem and will go ahead with the further steps. I am still entitled to believe step 
three without having in mind its proof. I will check that proof again, only if something makes me 
doubt that step. My memory preserves the force of the evidence, though it does not preserves the 
evidence itself. Even though the evidence is forgotten, the force of the evidence remains. !
!
As in the above case, we remember many propositions, without remembering the evidence. Still, 
memory-beliefs come with a certainty, because beliefs preserve the force of evidence, though not 
the evidence itself. Owens says that if a proposition appears in the mind as a flashbulb thought, 
one would be checking one’s own past, or would be checking whether the proposition is true. We 
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do not normally do that when we seem to remember the proposition. The fact, that one seems to 
remember, is still relevant to the justification that one holds. We are entitled to hold a memory-
belief if we seem to remember it, because memory-beliefs come with a certain force of the 
evidence though it does not preserve the evidence itself.!
!
!
5.4! Epistemic Theory of Memory!
!
According to the epistemic theory of memory, memory entails knowledge. Bernecker [67:2010] 
summarises the theory thus :!
!
1. S knows at t2 that p.!
2. S knew t1 that p.!
3. S’s knowing at t2 that p is suitably connected to S’s knowing at t1 that p.!
!
Going by the traditional view of knowledge, memory should meet the truth condition, belief 
condition and the justification condition. These three conditions should be met in the past, when 
subject acquires information, and in the present when the subject remembers the information. That 
is: !
!
While S remembers, S’s present knowledge implies: !
!
1. S believes at t2 that p. !
2. p is true at t2.!
3. S is justified at t2 in believing that p.!
!
!
Similarly, S’s past knowledge implies:!
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!
1. S believed at t1 that p.!
2. p was true at t1.!
3. S was justified at t1 in believing that p.!
!
If any of these conditions are not met, then the subject does not remember. To show that the 
epistemic theory fails, one needs to show that remembering is possible without meeting one or 
more of the above conditions. Remembering is factive and one cannot remember something that is 
not true. Thus the truth condition in the theory is unproblematic. If S remembers that p, p is true. 
The other two conditions, the belief conditions and the justification condition, are not so.  !
!
Epistemic theory assumes that memory preserves knowledge and that memory cannot generate 
knowledge on its own. Malcolm says, “… it may be misleading to speak of two elements of 
knowledge in memory, previous and present knowledge. There are not two pieces of knowledge, 
but one piece. Memory is the retention of knowledge. One knew something and still knows it. The 
present knowledge in memory is the same as the previous knowledge” [229:1963].!
!
A stronger version of epistemic theory of memory is the evidential theory. According to evidential 
theory, memory should not only preserve the previous knowledge, but also the justifications that 
one had for those beliefs. It adds a further condition to the epistemic theory.!
!
• S’s grounds for knowing at t1 that p are the same as his grounds for knowing at t2 that p.!
!
Apart from Malcolm, the evidential theory is advocated by David Annis [1980] and Andrew Naylor 
[1983].!
!
5.5! Belief in Memory!
!
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In his analysis of memory, Malcolm holds that remembering is not possible without belief 
[213:1963]. It is incoherent and paradoxical to state that, “I remember that p, but do not believe that 
p.” The incoherence is similar to Moore’s paradoxical statement, “It's raining but I believe that it is 
not raining.” It can be argued from here that to remember is at least to believe. Martin and 
Deutscher give a different explanation to this incoherence. They attempt to explain the incoherence 
without assuming that to remember is at least to believe.!
!
Martin and Deutscher write, “The incoherence of "I remember going for a walk, but I do not believe 
that I went for a walk" is quite straightforward. Only if X did happen can a person be right when he 
asserts, "I remember X." Only if X did not occur, however, can he be correct in his belief that X did 
not occur. Therefore it is impossible for a person to be right both in his claim to remember X and in 
his belief that X did not occur. Whatever the facts are he must be wrong” [170:1966].!
!
The above argument fails because the statement “I remember going for a walk, but I do not believe 
that I went for a walk” cannot be translated into “I remember X, but I believe that X did not occur.” 
In the former statement I do not hold any belief about X, whereas in the latter statement I hold a 
belief that X did not occur. The incoherence of the statement is not a result of the subject holding a 
belief contrary to what he remembers. It occurs because there is no belief at all to support the 
subject’s claim. !
!
The incoherence can be better explained if we treat the statement as a claim to remember, rather 
than genuine remembering. Sven Bernecker develops such an argument. According to Bernecker, 
when I claim to remember that p, I am convinced that p is the case and hence believe that p. Yet, 
the second part of the statement denies that I believe that p. “‘I remember that p; but I don’t believe 
that p’ is incoherent not because one cannot remember that p without believing that p but because 
one cannot claim to remember that p while claiming to not believe that p” [146:2007]. As the 
conditions for claiming to remember are distinct from the conditions for remembering, it does not 
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follow that remembering that p implies believing that p because claiming to remember that p 
implies claiming to believe that p. !
!
5.6! Cases: Memory without belief!
!
A case is presented by Norman Malcolm, where one gets a sudden thought that he was kidnapped 
as a kid [213:1963]. Unbeknownst to him, he was in fact kidnapped as a kid. He does not believe 
this and does not take this flashbulb-thought to be a case of remembering. The question is whether 
the thought that suddenly appears is a case of remembering or not. Malcolm says that there is no 
correct answer here. On the one hand, the thought is strikingly similar to what had happened to 
him the past, and hence is a case of remembering. On the other hand, the subject does not 
remember the kidnapping because “he does not even believe it.” Here Malcolm is examining 
whether all types of memory imply propositional memory or not. Malcolm concludes that the 
subject perceptually remembers the incident, but is unsure of the status of propositional memory in 
the case.!
!
“Martin and Deutscher present a similar case in their paper. “Suppose that someone asks a painter 
to paint an imaginary scene. The painter agrees to this and, taking himself to be painting some 
purely imaginary scene, paints a detailed picture of a farmyard, including a certain colored and 
shaped house, various people with detailed features, particular items of clothing, and so on. His 
parents then recognize the picture as a very accurate representation of a scene which the painter 
saw just once in his childhood. The figures and colors are as the painter saw them only once on 
the farm which he now depicts. We may add more and more evidence to force the conclusion that 
the painter did his work by no mere accident. Although the painter sincerely believes that his work 
is purely imaginary, and represents no real scene, the amazed observers have all the evidence 
needed to establish that in fact he is remembering a scene from childhood. What other explanation 
could there be for his painting being so like what he has seen?” [166-167:1966].!
!
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In both cases, the subjects hold no belief that they have learned that p, or had an experience e, in 
the past. They take their thought, what appears in the mind, to be a figment of their imagination. 
The onlookers are aware that the instance, the painting/kidnapping, is a case of remembering as 
they are aware of the subjects’ past. The onlookers say that the painter remembers because they 
have some evidence to show that he has learned that p in the past and that his current mental 
state is in some way causally connected to his earlier mental state when he learned that p. The 
painter says that he does not remember and that the painting is imaginary. !
!
What will serve as a base for my statement - ‘I know that I remember that p’? Can I know by 
introspection alone that, that what appears in my mind is a genuine memory-cognition and not an 
episode of imagination? The answer is no. Memory-cognition is not transparent to the subject. 
Subject needs information beyond what is available through introspection to know whether it is 
genuine memory or imagination. This opaqueness is true for all cognitive activities. All factive 
cognitive activities are opaque from a first-person perspective. Knowledge is not transparent, as 
the subject cannot always distinguish knowledge from belief just by introspection. !
!
In the above cases, the subjects do not have a belief. Before they confirm their past from the 
onlookers, if we were to ask them about the kidnapping or the farm visit, they would reply in 
negative. This means that he does not hold a dispositional belief that p too. Thus the present belief 
condition, the condition that S believes at t2 that p, fails when the subject remembers.!
!
!
5.7! Knowledge without belief!
!
Some philosophers are of the view that belief is not a necessary condition for knowledge. If 
knowledge is possible without belief, then showing that one can remember that p without believing 
that p will not defeat the epistemic theory of memory. Colin Radford says that “neither believing 
that P nor, a fortiori, being confident, sure, quite sure, or certain that P is a necessary condition of 
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knowing that P. Nor is it a necessary condition of knowing that P that one should have the right to 
be, or be justified in being, or have adequate grounds for being sure that P” [11:1966]. Radford 
presents a few cases to argue that knowledge is possible without belief. In an English quiz, Tom is 
asked a few questions on English history. Tom thinks that he does not know the answers, 
nevertheless he answers most of the questions correctly. Tom does not believe his answers, but he 
knows the answers. Timothy Williamson supports the view that knowledge does not involve belief. 
According to Williamson, instead of analysing knowledge in terms of belief, we should reverse the 
direction and analyse belief in terms of knowledge. Williamson [30:2000] argues that knowledge is 
an irreducible mental state.!
!
More recently, an empirical study conducted by Schwitzgebel supports Radford’s view. A set of 
cases similar to the case presented by Radford were given to a set of (non-philosophy) students 
and they reacted the way in which Radford suggests. i.e., the common notion is that one can know 
that p without believing that p. [Schwitzgebel & Myers-Schulz, 371:2013]!
!
Two objections can be raised against Radford’s case (and the study by Schwitzgebel). Firstly, Tom 
has no justification for p. He answers the questions correctly, without being sure of those answers. 
Thus, it can be said that Tom does not know that p, as he has no justification for believing that p. 
Secondly, according to Radford, for knowing that p, one need not be sure or pretty sure or 
confident. For believing that p, however, one needs to be sure, because belief is an attitude that we 
have when we take something to be true or accepts it. This poses a difficulty for Radford’s thesis. 
The cases suggest that the subject needs to be sure about his belief that p and need not have 
such surety about his knowledge that p. Tom is not sure about his answers, and yet Radford claims 
that he knows these answers. This is peculiar. One can know that p without being sure that p. But 
one cannot believe that p without being sure that p. According to Radford then, true belief becomes 
epistemically superior to knowledge. To avoid this difficulty, we will have to accept that Tom does 
know that p, and he believes that p.!
!
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But even if such arguments are plausible, and even if it can be plausibly argued that knowledge 
does not involve belief, it will not help epistemic theory as one can remember without satisfying the 
justification condition that epistemic theory holds.!
!
!
5.8! Justification in Memory !
!
The justification condition in the epistemic theory of memory has it that one should be justified in 
believing that p while one remembers. When S remembers that p, what kind of justification does S 
have? A common answer by a layperson would be that his memories are most often reliable. The 
subject knows that in the past, when he seems to remember something, it was true. This makes 
him take his memories to be reliable.  The obvious problem here is that of circularity. It is by 
memory one is aware that in the past, his memory beliefs were generally reliable.!
!
Evidential Retention Theory says that, for one to remember, one should not only retain the known 
proposition but also the original grounds by which one acquired the proposition. Norman Malcolm 
says, “when someone remembers that p does he have grounds for being sure that p? The answer 
is that he has the same grounds, if any, that he previously had... If the ground of his previous 
knowledge was testimony then the ground of present knowledge is that same previous testimony... 
If a man’s previous knowledge that p had no grounds, then in remembering that p his present 
knowledge has no grounds” [230:1963].!
!
While, Malcolm says that there are not two pieces of knowledge and that the present knowledge in 
memory is the same as the previous knowledge, it is the first step towards ruling out a causal 
connection. One may still ask whether the past acquisition of knowledge is causally connected with 
the present manifestation of knowledge. For this, an Evidential Retention Theorist’s reply would be 
similar to that of Roger Squire’s version of retention - that a certain process starts at the time of 
acquisition of knowledge which is in work during the retention of knowledge, and is exercised 
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during the manifestation of knowledge. Malcolm agrees that the nature of this process is unknown. 
As the nature of the process is not adequately explained, the argument against Simple Retention 
Theory is valid here too. Since the required process starts while acquiring the proposition, and is 
exercised during the manifestation of the knowledge, and since it is only through this process one 
can recall the previously retained knowledge, the process could very well be a causal one. !
!
Another argument against Evidential Theory raised by Sven Bernecker is that it fails to filter cases 
of relearning. “The evidential retention condition doesn’t rule out instances where a person knew at 
t1 that p on some grounds and knows at t2 that p on the same grounds but fails to remember that 
p, since he had completely forgotten that p in the interval between t1 and t2” [106:2010]. According 
to the evidential theory we will have to treat such cases as memory.!
!
To show that the justification condition of the epistemic theory is not necessary, Bernecker presents 
a case: !
!
“Sometime in the past, at t1, S believed that something was occurring in front of him (e.g., the Loch 
Ness monster poking its head out of the water), something which he was, in fact, witnessing, but 
when he had plausible but misleading reasons to suppose that he had just been given a strong 
hallucinogenic drug. […] S wasn’t justified at t1 in believing that such a thing was taking place in 
front of him and thus he didn’t know that it was. At t2, S learns that, in spite of his past evidence, he 
had not actually been given a hallucinogenic drug but only a placebo. He had really seen what he 
had irrationally believed to be seeing while falsely thinking to be hallucinating. At t3 S is able to 
give an accurate account of what he witnessed at t1” [144:2007]. Bernecker proceeds to say that S 
may be said to remember at t3 though he was not justified in believing his eyes at t1. This case, 
according to Bernecker, shows that the past justification condition is not necessary and that the 
epistemic theory of memory fails.!
!
The problem here is that there are two propositions that are remembered. !
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!
At t1,!
1. S believes that he has a certain experience.!
2. S believes that he has taken a hallucinogenic drug.!
3. S believes that the experience he is having is an effect of the drug.!
!
!
At t2,!
4. S knows that the drug was in fact a placebo. (Past justification for this is falsified. Now this 
proposition is a case of elliptical memory. S remembers that he had taken a tablet and now 
knows that it was in fact a placebo.)!
!
At t3,!
5. S remembers that the drug was a placebo.!
6. S infers from 5 that the experience he had at t1 was genuine. (Past justification for this is 
falsified. Now this too, is a case of elliptical memory. S remembers that he had an experience, 
and now knows that it is genuine.)!
!
We can say that this is a case of impure memory, and is like the case presented by Malcolm. A 
person sees a bird and later learns that birds with such characteristics are cardinal birds. He says 
that “I remember that I saw a cardinal.” At the time of seeing the bird he did not know that it was 
cardinal. He had no justification to believe that that bird was cardinal. Malcolm says that he is still 
right in his claim because this is a case of elliptical memory. What he means when he says “I saw a 
cardinal”, is that “I saw a (bird and now I know that that bird was a) cardinal.” Similarly, in 
Bernecker’s case, when the subject says that “I remember that I saw a Loch Ness monster”, he 
means, “I remember (the drug I had taken was a placebo which makes my experience genuine 
and) that I saw a Loch Ness Monster.” This case is not enough to show that the past justification 
condition fails.!
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!
Consider a counter example for present justification condition. Suppose at t1, the subject watches 
a terrorist attack and sees people getting killed. He sees the explosion, chaos and the attack 
clearly. Because he saw the attack, at t2, he remembers everything about the attack, and knows 
that the attack was real. At t3, S is told by a newspaper, which he believes to be reliable, and an 
internet community that the attack was a staged one, and no one was harmed. He is also 
presented with misleading evidence to believe this idea. At t3, S does not know that the attack was 
real. He still remembers everything that he had seen,. He remembers the attack. S fails to know 
that the attack was real, despite remembering it. S knows at t1 that p, at t3 remembers everything 
that he knew t1, yet does not know that p at t3. While remembering, S lacks justification for his 
belief that the attack was real. Here the present justification condition is not met, S does not know, 
but he still remembers. It is possible to remember that p at t2, without having justification for p.!
!
5.9! Conclusion!
!
While there is an incoherence in the statement, “I believe that p, but do not remember that p”, it 
cannot be argued from here that to remember is at least to believe. Martin and Deutscher say, “If it 
were impossible to remember while believing one is not remembering, one would be saved the 
embarrassment of thinking that one is originating a tune or an argument when one is 
not” [168:1966]. While this case could be treated as a case with dispositional belief (if the subject 
hears the same tune in the radio, chances are that he might remember that he had heard it 
previously), it is still possible to remember without belief. Similarly, one can remember that p, 
without having justification for p. In sum, the belief condition and the justification condition are not 
necessary for remembering. One can remember that p, without knowing that p.!
!
!
!
!
 100
!
Chapter 6!
!
CONCLUSION!
!
!
!
In the introduction, I had said that this thesis was an attempt to consider the central question in the 
philosophy of memory, ‘what is memory’? To better understand the nature of memory, I looked into 
four sub questions. These sub questions are:!
!
1. What are the accepted philosophical views on memory? Are these views problematic?!
2. Is memory a passive device which merely registers and reproduces past information? What are 
the problems with such a view?!
3. How should we construe causation in memory?!
4. How does memory provide us with knowledge?!
!
I have started my work by examining two major theories of memory, Representative Realism and 
Direct Realism. The debate between these two theories dates back to Aristotle’s times, and is still 
very much alive. In representative realism, while one remembers, one’s immediate awareness is 
that of a representation or image. To differentiate the memory image from other images - images 
from fantasy or imagination - a representative realist has to look for an indicator, a memory-marker, 
in the image itself. Hume differentiates a memory image from other images on two counts. First, 
memory-images appear with force and vivacity. Second, memory-images retain temporal order and 
form. These criteria are not enough, as images from imagination can be at times more forceful and 
intense than memory-images. Also, it is not quite right to say that memory-images preserve 
temporal order. Another attempt to find a memory-marker was from Russell. Russell maintained 
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that the memory-images come with feelings of familiarity and feelings of pastness. But these 
markers are inadequate, as an episode of imagination, if entertained very often, can come back to 
the mind with feelings of pastness and feelings of familiarity. The problem with memory-markers is 
that, they try to look for a characteristic in the image itself to differentiate memory-images from 
other images. One needs information beyond what is available from the image, to conclusively say 
whether the image is a memory-image or not. Features of the image do not determine whether it is 
a memory-image or not. The fact that it represents a past event makes it a memory-image. 
Whether it represents a past event or not cannot be a interpreted from the image itself.!
!
Direct realism attempts to avoid these questions by arguing that, while remembering one is directly 
aware of the past, without image as an intermediary. The question then is, how can the subject 
have an immediate awareness of a past event now, at the time of remembering, as the past event 
cannot exist now. One reply to this is that the past exists at the time of remembering. The view is 
that, ‘existence’ does not mean present existence. In the series of existence, past events have a 
place too. That is, direct awareness extends beyond present existence. AD Woozley and John 
Laird support this view. When it is seen thus, it will become an argument regarding the nature of 
time. But then, the problem is that, a direct realist will have to explain why such an argument fails 
to deliver us with an awareness of the future. Direct realism cannot explain the cases where some 
of the details from an event are incorrectly remembered. If the subject’s awareness is direct, if the 
subject has a direct access to the past, incorrect remembering seems impossible. Both 
representative realism and direct realism come with their own set of problems, and both theories 
find it difficult to distinguish memory-experience from other similar experiences. !
!
Memory traces or engrams are changes in brain that constitute the record of an experience. 
Though memory trace is a neuropsychological postulate, this has its implications in philosophy. If 
we take traces to be a form of representation, many of the arguments raised between 
representative realists and direct realists will fail. John Sutton takes this position and says that 
“when representations are thought of as brain states, it is clear that they are not immediate objects 
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of experience which a subject then consciously put to use” [282:1998]. While remembering, one is 
not aware of these representations and hence it can be said that we are immediately aware of the 
past. !
!
Both these theories primarily consider experiential memory in their analyses. These theories will 
not be adequate to explain propositional memory. Both representative realists and direct realists 
see memory as a passive device. The subject stores the event, and later retrieves or reproduces 
the event. Memory functions like a photocopier. One of the views that stems from this, is the copy 
theory of memory - memory acts as a passive device which stores and reproduces past 
information. In contrast to this view is ‘activism’, which holds that memory does not merely copy the 
past and that memory actively reconstructs the past. There is a longstanding debate among 
Cognitive psychologists on these two views, activism and passivism. !
!
According to copy theory, while one remembers, there has to be a one-to-one connection between 
the past thought content and the present thought content. Remembering is a copy of the past. One 
of the problems that such a theory has is that it cannot explain condensed memories. There are 
two types of condensed memories. Firstly, there are cases where one recalls a certain period from 
the past and comes up with a summary of that period. For example, one can say something like, 
“the weather was bad last year.” In the past one might not have entertained the exact same 
thought, that is, he might not have thought “the weather is bad this year”. Based on this, one can 
say that as the remembered thought does not have a one-to-one relationship with the past thought, 
the copy theory is flawed. This objection is not enough to show that the copy theory fails. In this 
case, it is true that the present thought does not have a one-to-one relation with the past thought. 
One can say that the thought “the weather was bad lat year” was an inferential judgement. One 
remembers that there were many days where one thought that the weather is bad, and one infers 
from that that the weather was bad last year. !
!
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There is another sense in which we condense our memories. When one remembers the time one 
spent with one’s friends, one will not recall the entire time or the entire conversation one had. What 
is remembered might be the topic discussed, the drink shared or the duration of the meeting. In 
such cases too, condensation happens. But here, it is not an inferential judgement. Rather, it gives 
the remembered thought a narrative unity. In our day-to-day lives, such condensation plays an 
important role. These condensations give our life a narrative unity. That is, memory is a 
constructive process. This view is supported by a growing body of evidence among psychologists. 
Defending this view, Schechtman writes, “there does seem to be good evidence for the intuitively 
plausible claim that a central function of our memory is turning the countless experiences with 
which we are bombarded into a manageable and comprehensible life history, that this will involve 
summarizing, condensing, and rewriting the facts remembered, and that such work is therefore 
pervasive in our autobiographical memories” [11:2008]. If such summarisation were not part of the 
function of memory, we will not be able to make sense out of the very large pieces of information 
that we encounter in our daily lives. That is, to avoid information cluttering, we will have to resort to 
a reconstructive process, whereby we weave out a story from the cues that are given by memory. 
In this sense, we are “subtle authors” when we remember our past.!
!
If memory is not a passive device, one will have to explain the correspondence between one’s past 
cognitive state and one’s present state of mind. Only such a correspondence will ensure that the 
remembered event or proposition is from the past. This correspondence will also ensure that the 
subject’s recollection is from memory and that it is not a relearned one. Most philosophers and 
psychologists have come to advocate the view that memory involves a causal connection, that the 
representation of an event in memory is causally connected to the past event. !
!
It was Martin and Deutscher’s influential paper Remembering, that brought causation in memory. 
Their argument is based on three cases. In two of them, the subject does not believe what appears 
in his mind. In one of the cases, under hypnotic suggestion, the subject believes what appears in 
his mind and mistakenly takes it to be memory. Using these cases, Martin and Deutscher go on to 
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argue that an appropriate causal connection is sufficient and necessary for a case of recollection to 
be a case of remembering. One can argue that Martin and Duetscher’s argument is from counter-
factuals. The suggestion is that if S had not experienced E in the past, S will not remember E now. 
A counter-factual statement is not equivalent to causal statement. Jaegwon Kim writes that  
“counter factual dependency is too broad to pin down causal dependency” [571:1973]. From the 
statement “if S had not experienced E in the past, he would not remember it now”, we cannot 
conclude that S’s remembering E was caused by his experience E in the past. !
!
There are other arguments that are presented to explain the correspondence between one’s past 
cognitive state and one’s present state. One of them is the retention theory. According to this 
theory, memory does not involve a causal process. Memory is retention of knowledge. In virtue of 
having an experience in the past, the subject acquires and retains a certain ability to represent that 
event in the present. According to this view, a causal connection is invoked by some philosophers 
to explain temporary forgetting - cases where the subject learns something, forgets what he 
learned and remembers it later. A view that memory is retention of knowledge is often overlooked 
because philosophers think that it cannot explain temporary forgetting. If memory is just the ability 
to retain knowledge, temporary forgetting cannot be explained. Squires say that just like a teddy 
bear’s ability to squeak may be temporarily lost during winter but regained in summer, our memory 
sometimes get discontinuous and we temporarily forget what we learned [186:1969]. This, 
however, is no reason to think that one lost his ability to retain what he learned in the past 
altogether. One argument against this view, originally motivated by psychological views on 
memory, is that, we never forget anything. That is, all cases of forgetting are temporary forgetting. 
In principle, given the right cue, one can remember things from the past. Another argument against 
this view is that the theory maintains that memory is retention of knowledge but fails to explain the 
process of retention.!
!
Presence of memory traces can explain causation in a better way. Traces explain the process 
involved in the causal retention. Structural modifications in neurons are caused by the subject’s 
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experience, and these neurons are stimulated again while one remembers. There is a continuous 
causal chain that extends from the time of the experience to the time of remembering here. One of 
the arguments often raised against traces is that there is little or no empirical evidence for the 
existence of traces. It is true that neurologists are yet to come up with conclusive evidence for 
memory traces. But the notion of existence of memory trace is indispensable among neurologists 
and psychologists alike, in the study of memory. Also, recent research have shown existence of 
such structural modification in the brain of simple organisms [Squire and Kandel: 2009].!
!
As most of our knowledge comes from memory, some philosophers have argued for an epistemic 
theory of memory, according to which, memory entails knowledge. According to this view, if S 
remembers that p, S knows that p. Most philosophers have come to presuppose this epistemic 
theory of memory in their analyses of memory. The relationship between memory and knowledge 
is the last chapter of my thesis. Two questions are examined in this chapter. 1. How to distinguish 
between those memories that can be regarded as knowledge and those memories that can be 
regarded only as beliefs? 2. Does propositional memory entail knowledge? !
!
If the epistemological theory of memory is true, it follows that memory must satisfy a truth 
condition, a justification condition and a belief condition. Among these, the truth condition is 
unproblematic. One can remember something only if it is true. The belief condition and justification 
conditions are however problematic. There is an incoherence in the statement “I remember that p, 
but I do not believe that p.” But this incoherence can be explained without assuming that to 
remember is at least to believe. One of the arguments to show that this can be done is from Martin 
and Deutscher. However that argument is flawed. The argument just shows that one cannot hold a 
belief that E did not happen while claiming that one remembers E. The incoherence does not stem 
from the subject holding a belief contrary to what he remembers. It stems from the subject not 
holding any belief at all. A better argument presented by Bernecker, says that one cannot claim to 
remember while claiming to not believe. The conditions for claiming to remember are different from 
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conditions to remember and thus, it can be shown that remembering that p does not imply 
believing that p. !
!
The cases presented by Martin and Deutscher in their analysis of causation shows that one can 
remember p while holding no belief about p. But arguing that remembering does not imply 
believing is not enough to show that the epistemic theory is flawed. There are philosophers who 
hold a view that knowledge does not imply belief. Using this view, it can be argued that, even if the 
subject does not believe while he remembers, he knows. To show that the epistemic theory is 
flawed, then, one will have to show that one can remember even if the justification condition is not 
met. An argument presented by Bernecker to show that one can remember even if the justification 
condition is not met is analysed. I believe that this argument is faulty, and I have tried to show the 
problems with the argument. I have also presented a better argument to show that justification 
condition is not necessary for remembering. This shows that one can remember that p, and yet fail 
to know that p. The view that one can remember that p without knowing that p is not a new one. In 
Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates holds a view that memory does not provide us with knowledge.!
!
Memory is an interesting topic because it is by memory we recall the past, form beliefs about the 
present and imagine tomorrow. But it is equally intricate and complex. Probably that is why in his 
analysis of memory, Thomas Reid often had to invoke the “will of the maker” and Russell had to 
end his lecture on memory by the note that his analysis of memory “is probably extremely faulty, 
but I don’t know how to improve it” [187:2007].!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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